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POLICING BIAS AND CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN
ZONING DECISIONMAKING
MARK CORDES*

INTRODUCTION
Courts have traditionally reviewed zoning decisions for substantive correctness, applying in most instances the deferential
arbitrary and capricious standard.' In recent years, however,
courts have increasingly reviewed zoning decisions for procedural
correctness, such as the satisfaction of notice and hearing requirements.2 This reflects a growing recognition that in many instances

the meaningful assurance for proper zoning decisions must come
from procedural rather than substantive protections.3

Central to any scheme of procedural safeguards is the need
for an impartial decisionmaker. Although the process constitution-

ally due has been determined by a balancing test, 4 courts and commentators have often recognized the essential role that impartial
decisionmakers play in assuring procedural fairness.5 Biased decisionmakers not only threaten accurate decisions, but also undermine the legitimacy of governmental processes. Indeed, the
efficacy of other safeguards are to a large extent contingent upon
* Associate Professor of Law, Northern Illinois University; B.S., Portland State
University; J.D., Willamette University; J.S.M., Stanford University.
1. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty, 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926Xtest applied to
determine validity of the zoning ordinance was whether provisions were clearly arbitrary
and capricious). See generally D. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 2.38 (1982). But see 1 N.
WILLIAMS, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW § 7.05 (1975 & Supp. 1986Xciting exceptions
to the arbitrary and capricious rule).
2. Horn v. County of Ventura, 24 Cal. 3d 605, -, 596 P.2d 1134, 1137, 156 Cal. Rptr.
718, 721 (1979); Grotto v. Little Friends, Inc., 104 Ill. App. 3d 105, -, 432 N.E.2d 634, 636
(1982); Paquette v. Zoning Bd., 372 A.2d 973, 974 (R.I. 1977). For a discussion of equal
protection problems in land use regulation, see generally D. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW
§§ 2.38-2.40 (2d ed. 1988). See also Developments in the Law - Zoning, 91 HARV. L. REV.
1427, 1524-28 (1978Xdiscussing the requirements of due process in zoning situations).
3. See generally 3

R. ANDERSON,

AMERICAN

LAW OF ZONING

3d, §§ 19.23-.25

(1986Xdiscussing meetings, rules, and quorums); C. WEAVER & R. BABCOCK, CITY ZONING:
THE ONCE AND FUTURE FRONTIER 269-72 (1979Xdiscussing professionalization and
procedural reform); Kahn, In Accordance with a Constitutional Plan: Procedural Due
Process and Zoning Decisions, 6 HASTING CONST. L.Q. 1011, 1037-44 (1979Xdiscussing
procedural problems and the applicable constitutional law when evaluating zoning cases).
4. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332-35 (1976Xtermination of disability
benefits case balancing the private interest affected by official action, the risk of erroneous
deprivation and the value of additional safeguards, and the government's interest).
5. See, e.g., Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60 (1972Xcity mayor was
considered biased judge because the city benefitted financially from criminal convictions);
Redish & Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the values of ProceduralDue Process,
95 YALE L.J. 455, 483-84 (1986Xaddressing the Supreme Court's recognition that impartial
adjudicators are essential to attainment of justice).
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some degree of impartiality.'
The need for impartial decisionmaking and the problems
which attend its denial are particularly acute with regard to the
zoning process. Not only are significant rights affected by land use
decisions, but the localized nature of the decisions themselves
makes them particularly vulnerable to problems of bias and conflicts of interest. Furthermore, the growing "dealmaking" perception of zoning practice, in which zoning decisions are often made
in a very particularized and seemingly ad hoc manner,7 raises
legitimacy concerns exacerbated by partial decisionmakers.
Whatever the merit of such practices, they heighten the potential
for personal abuse and undermine the perception of zoning
legitimacy.
It is not surprising, therefore, that in recent years courts have
begun to pay closer attention to problems of bias and conflicts of
interest in zoning.' Unlike requirements for notice and hearings
which typically are provided for by statute, however, impartiality
requirements find only a limited basis in statutory law. Therefore,
in many instances courts have relied on the administrative nature
of zoning decisions as an alternative ground for the provision of
impartiality in zoning decisions.9
Despite this growing concern with problems of bias and conflicts of interest, the regulation of impartiality in zoning is problematic in several respects. First, the highly localized nature of
zoning decisionmaking results in a greater frequency of conflicts
than are usually found in other forms of decisionmaking. Not only
are zoning decisions made by boards or governing bodies drawn
from the immediate area, but decisions frequently have a diffused
impact. At a minimum, decisionmakers are often familiar with
6. See, e.g., Redish and Marshall, supra note 5, at 492-93 (discussing different categories
of bias that threaten accurate decisions).
7. See generally R. ELLICKSON & D. TARLOCK, LAND USE CONTROLS 236-38
(198lXdiscussing dealmaking in zoning); Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land
Controlsas a Problem of Local Legitimacy, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 839, 841-42 (1983Xaddressing
the problems stemming from local governments making unfair and irrational land
development decisions).
8. E.g., Manookian v. Blaine County, 112 Idaho 697, __, 735 P.2d 1008, 1112
(1987Xconditional use permit voided because conflict of interest existed between officials
involved in zoning process); Thornbury Township Bd. of Supervisors v. W.D.D., Inc., 119
Pa. Commw. __, 546 A.2d 744, 747 (1988) (invalidating vote of supervisors on subdivision
plan because of bias of one of the supervisors).
9. See Buell v. City of Bremerton, 80 Wash. 2d 518, __, 495 P.2d 1358, 1362-63
(1972Xinvalidating rezoning ordinance because chairman of planning commission had
possible interest in rezoned property); Fasano v. Board of Comm'rs, 264 Or. 574, -, 507
P.2d 23, 30 (1973Xparties are entitled to hearing before a tribunal which has had no
prehearing or ex parte contacts concerning zoning changes).
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local issues and inevitably have biases regarding the development
of land in their community.
A second and more significant problem in regulating bias and
conflicts of interest in zoning is the dual adjudicative and political
nature of the zoning process. This has frequently manifested itself
in the legislative/adjudicative distinction, with the consequential
refusal by courts to police rezoning decisions because of their perceived "legislative" nature.1 ° Beyond that, however, remains the
basic concern of how to properly assess and accommodate the
political dimensions of zoning decisions while still guarding against
improper influences.
This article will attempt a comprehensive review of the issues
involved in policing bias and conflicts of interests in zoning decisionmaking. Part one will briefly discuss the nature of zoning decisionmaking and the value of impartial decisionmakers. Part two
will then examine various regulatory sources that might be used to
regulate bias and conflicts of interest, focusing on both statutory
and nonstatutory grounds. Thereafter, part three will examine the
legislative/adjudicative distinction in zoning and argue that the
traditional refusal to police conflicts by legislative bodies should be
rejected in favor of an approach which allows policing of rezoning
decisions.
Part four of the article will examine the difficult issue regarding the degree of impartiality that should be required. Recognizing that some bias is inevitable, it will suggest that the basic values
served by impartiality, together with pragmatic restraints, govern
regulation of bias and conflicts of interest. In addition, part four
will examine specific types of bias and conflicts of interest in zoning, focusing on financial conflicts, associational conflicts, prejudgment and bias, ex parte contacts, and campaign contributions.
Finally, part five of the article will discuss enforcement procedures and remedies when conflicts arise. It will examine what
action is required of zoning decisionmakers when an impermissible conflict exists and what judicial remedies should be available
when a decision has been made in the face of an impermissible
conflict.
10. See, e.g., Schauer v. City of Miami Beach, 112 So. 2d 838, 841 (Fla. 1959Xamending
zoning ordinance is legislative function); Fiser v. City of Knoxville, 584 S.W.2d 659, 663
(Tenn. App. 1979Xenactment of municipal zoning ordinances are legislative exercises of
police power); Anthony v. City of Kewanee, 79 Ill. App. 2d 243, 247, 223 N.E.2d 738, 740
(1967Xzoning and rezoning ordinances are legislative acts); D. MANDELKER, supra note 2,
at 270-71.
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ZONING AND THE IMPORTANCE OF IMPARTIALITY
A.

THE ZONING PROCESS

Zoning is the primary means by which local governments regulate the use and development of land." Often viewed as an outgrowth of nuisance law, zoning was initially premised on the
segregation of incompatible or conflicting land uses to enhance
land enjoyment.' 2 This is most frequently accomplished by dividing a municipality into various districts with designated permitted
3
and prohibited uses.'
Similar to other regulatory schemes, zoning seeks a proper
allocation of resources pursuant to a variety of means.14 This necessarily involves a balancing of both public and private interests; in
particular, the interests of landowners as such and in their capacity
as neighbors. In its most common form this involves placing reciprocal restrictions on land to maximize overall enjoyment.' 5
The variety of techniques used to accomplish zoning's purposes has grown significantly over the years.' 6 Despite this growth
in complexity, the vast majority of zoning decisions concern
7
change considerations directed at specific parcels of land.' Comprehensive zoning generally requires that local government initially place all land inside its borders within some use
designation.'" Thus, most zoning decisions subsequent to the
enactment of a comprehensive zoning ordinance involve proposals that current restrictions be changed or modified in some manner, usually for a limited area of land.
Zoning ordinances typically provide several basic mechanisms
11. D. MANDELKER, supra note 1, at § 1.1.
12. Id. at § 1.03.
13. Id.
14. The purposes or goals of zoning have been expressed in a number of ways.
Underlying most of these approaches is the notion of a proper allocation of resources. See,
e.g., D. MANDELKER, THE ZONING DILEMMA 23-24 (1971Xzoning is necessary to prevent
externalities which interfere with the land resource).
15. The notion of reciprocity is common to zoning; that is, restrictions are placed on all
land in a district so that the burdens placed on a landowner by particular restrictions are
partially offset by the benefits received by similar restrictions on neighboring land. Penn
Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 139-40 (1978XRehnquist, J., dissenting).
16. The expanding nature of zoning devices in recent years has been welldocumented. These have included techniques such as floating zones, overlay zones, forms
of contract zoning, transferrable development rights, planned-unit developments, and
cluster zoning. See generally R. ELLICKSON & D. TARLOCK, supra note 7, at 253-69
(focusing on types of flexibility devices).
17. See R. ELLICKSON & D. TARLOCK, supra note 7, at 59 (focus of zoning no longer
"fixed advanced allocations" but rather case-by-case review); Rose, supra note 7, at 841
(attributing to critics the complaint that individual land decisions amount to "deals" with
landowners and developers); C. WEAVER & R. BABCOCK, supra note 3, at 253-69 (land use
regulation allows change in response to specific proposals).
18. D. MANDELKER, supra note 2, at § 1.03.
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for changing or modifying a current restriction. First, ordinances
usually provide for two forms of what have been traditionally considered administrative relief: variances and special-uses."9 In both
instances the ordinance establishes criteria specifying under what
circumstances the request will be granted. In the case of variances
this usually requires a showing of both unusual circumstances and
undue hardship.20 Special-uses, on the other hand, involve activities which potentially might present problems in a particular
zone. 21 The special-use device addresses this concern by establishig standards and conditions which must be met in order for a permit to issue, presumably to ensure compatibility with surrounding
uses.

22

Contrasted to the variance and special-use techniques is the
actual rezoning of the land in question. Unlike the variance and
special-use decisions which are made pursuant to standards articulated in the ordinance, rezonings involve an actual amendment of
the zoning map itself to effect the change. 3 Although zoning
enabling acts typically require that rezonings "be in accordance
with a comprehensive plan," courts have not traditionally applied
19. A zoning variance has been defined as:
[a]n administrative authorization for property to be used in a manner departing
from the literal requirements of a zoning ordinance. A variance may be granted
where the requested use or structure is not contrary to the public interest, and
where strict enforcement of the applicable regulations would result in
unnecessary hardship.
7 P. ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS § 43.01[2](1988). A special use, on the
other hand, has been defined as "a form of administrative relief which allows a landowner
to use his property in a manner permitted by the zoning ordinance provided he demonstrates compliance with all standards and criteria enumerated in the legislation." Id. at
§ 44.01[2]. Therefore, the distinguishing characteristic between the two is that "special
use" refers primarily to the type of use, whereas a variance is associated with the uniqueness of the given property. D. HAGMAN & J. JUERGENSMEYER, URBAN PLANNING & LAND
DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAw 183 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter D. HAGMAN].
Both courts and commentators have traditionally viewed variances and special-use
decisions as being administrative in nature. See, e.g., Pentagram Corp. v. City of Seattle, 28
Wash. App. 219, -, 622 P.2d 892, 895 (1981Xissuance of special use permit was administrative action even though done by city council); Note, Arnel Development Co. v. City of
Costa Mesa: Rezoning by Initiative and Landowners' Due Process Rights, 70 CALIF. L.
REV. 1107, 1116, n.59 (1982Xciting cases holding that amending of a zoning ordinance is a
legislative act); Note, Instant Planning - Land Use Regulation by Initiative in California,
61 S. CAL. L. REV. 497, 504 (1988Xzoning variance labelled "administrative" or "adjudicatory"); Rosenberg, Referendum Zoning: Legal Doctrine and Practice, 53 U. CIN. L. REV.
381, 411 (1984Xvariances, special exceptions and special use permits considered administrative or adjudicative acts). This is because both are guided by established criteria and are
typically made by appointed administrative boards. 7 P. ROHAN, supra note 18, at
§ 51.01[3]; see D. HAGMAN, supra, at 166-68 (describing administrative relief generally).
20. D. MANDELKER, supra note 2, at § 6.36. See Otto v. Steinhilber, 282 N.Y. 71, 24
N.E.2d 851 (1939Xunnecessary hardship).
21. See D. HAGMAN, supra note 19, at 183-88.
22. See id. at 185-88 (discussing standards and conditions).
23. Id. at 164-65.
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this requirement with rigor.2 4 Because rezonings affect a change
in the ordinance itself, they are necessarily made by local governing bodies and have been traditionally viewed as legislative
decisions.2 5 Despite these differences, commentators have noted
that in many respects rezonings are interchangeable with the variance and special-use devices as a means of seeking zoning
changes.2 6
Early zoning theory contemplated that land use decisions
would primarily occur through the initial allocation decisions with
only minor adjustments through the use of variances, special-use
permits, and rezoning.2 ' This model of zoning envisioned a
planned, almost static land development in which most land uses
would be zoned as of right.28 Although the above forms of relief
were available, they were clearly intended to be used infrequently
and in exceptional cases.2 9
It is now widely recognized that current zoning practice little
resembles this notion of planned development, but instead places
an emphasis on flexibility and change through the use of variances,
special-use permits, and rezoning. ° In particular, these devices
are often used to delay concrete decisions as a response to an
actual development proposal. For example, municipalities often
subject numerous uses within a particular district to the specialuse process, frequently providing only very generalized standards
for issuance of a permit. This in effect provides municipalities
with significant flexibility and discretion in responding to particu24. D. MANDELKER, supra note 2, at § 3.14.
25. See, e.g., Wait v. City of Scottsdale, 127 Ariz. 107, -, 618 P.2d 601, 602 (1980Xcity
council's decision not to rezone was legislative decision). Cf. Ensign Bickford Realty v. City
Council, 68 Cal. App. 3d 467, __, 137 Cal. Rptr. 304, 307 (1977Xenactment of zoning
ordinance is legislative function). See generally D. HAGMAN, supra note 19, at 169-72
(distinguishing zoning as legislative action from quasi-judicial decisions); 7 P. ROHAN, supra
note 19, at § 50.01[1][a] (zoning ordinance enactment and amendments traditionally
considered legislative act).
26. See Rose, supra note 7, at 841 (discussing criticism of piecemeal changes). See also
D. MANDELKER, supra note 14, at 66-67 (zoning changes may take the form of
amendments, variances or exceptions).
27. R. ELLICKSON & D. TARLOCK, supra note 7, at 59.
28. D. MANDELKER, supra note 2, at 78.
29. For a discussion of the history of zoning, see Krasnowiecki, Abolish Zoning, 31
SYRACUSE L. REV. 719, 723-27 (1980).
30. In recent years commentators have increasingly argued that zoning decisions occur
in a particularized, ad hoc manner, with no pretense of long-term planning. See R.
BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME 130-33 (1966Xplanners no longer believe it is possible to
predict precisely growth patterns); D. MANDELKER, supra note 2, at 57, 63-64 (discussing
the response of zoning decisionmakers to outside pressures); R. ELLICKSON & D. TARLOCK,
supra note 7, at 236-38 (characterizing local zoning authorities as dealmakers);
Krasnowiecki, supra note 29, at 719-20 (arguing that real development occurs only through
changes, variances and the like).
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lar use proposals.3"
Even more significant has been the increased use of rezonings
to affect changes in a zoning scheme. This is partly attributable to
the growth of downzoning techniques by which undeveloped
property is initially heavily restricted with the clear intention of
rezoning the property in response to specific development proposals. 2 Under this approach rezoning decisions are basically used to
make particularized decisions regarding the suitability of a proposed use and thus in effect administer land development on a
case-by-case basis. This is often done in what has been described
as a "dealmaking" context in which land is rezoned conditioned on
concessions by the landowner.3 3
These current practices indicate the manner in which zoning
decisionmaking has shifted from a planned to a more particularized, ad hoc response to development. This is partially attributable to the inadequacies of traditional planning theory in a fluid
society. 3 4 Static end-state zoning is necessarily speculative in
nature and thus at best can only approximate possible development needs and patterns. By in effect delaying determinations of
actual uses until concrete proposals are made, municipalities can
assess the potential impact of uses in a concrete situation. Moreover, as suggested above, delayed and flexible decisionmaking also
provides municipalities with significant leverage over potential
development in order to obtain developer concessions.3 5
The primary problem that has confronted courts in recent
years is how to properly control the particularized, ad hoc decisionmaking that currently characterizes the zoning process.3 6
31. But cf. D. HAGMAN, supra note 19, at 47 (suggesting that "flexibility" may be a
euphemism for "ad hocery").
32. See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDING THE AMERICAN
CITY 206-08 (1968Xabstracted in R. ELLICKSON & D. TARLOCK, supra note 7, at 23435Xdiscussing the "wait and see" approach); D. MANDELKER, supra note 103-04 (discussing
ad hoc nature of zoning changes based on policy of "watchful waiting"); Krasnowiecki,
supra note 29, at 753 (arguing that case by case approach is dictated by social and political
realities).
33. R. ELLICKSON & D. TARLOCK, supra note 7, at 234-38. Other commentators have
also emphasized the "dealmaking" nature of current zoning practices. E.g., Rose, supra
note 7, at 847.
34. D. MANDELKER, supra note 14, at 103-04 (concluding that managing change is the
most pressing problem in zoning control); NATIONAL COMMISSION ON URBAN PROBLEMS,
BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY 206-08 (1968Xabstracted in R. ELLICKSON & D. TARLOCK,
supra note 7, at 234-35Xdiscussing why the "wait and see" approach has replaced selfexecuting regulations); C. WEAVER & R. BABCOCK, supra note 3, at 260 (identifying longterm comprehensive planning as a "virtual impossibility"); Rose, supra note 7, at 874-78
(discussing modern planning doctrine).
35. R. ELLICKSON & D. TARLOCK, supra note 7, at 236.

36. Rose, supra note 7, at 848; Tarlock, Detecting and Challenging Bias in Zoning
Board Decisions, in 1987 ZONING & PLANNING LAW HANDBOOK 83, 83 (1987).
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Both courts and commentators have recognized that discretion is
an inevitable and necessary part of zoning decisionmaking. 37 Zoning decisions, no matter what their form, rarely turn on a straightforward assessment of objective facts; rather, they usually involve
the careful balancing of competing concerns. As noted by Richard
Babcock, "local zoning issues are a sui generis combination of policy, politics, fact and emotion."'38 This is most obvious with rezonings which typically lack guidelines other than comprehensive
plans. Even special-use and variances decisions, because of the
generalized nature of the standard used, often turn on perceptions
of public welfare and a subtle balancing of concerns.3 9
At the same time, courts and commentators have noted that
the ad hoc, discretionary nature of such decisions makes them subject to substantial abuse and unfairness.4" This is troubling for several reasons. First, of course, is that uncontrolled decisions might
interfere with a community's land use goals and the proper allocation of resources. Although communities might pursue a variety of
purposes through zoning, it is generally presumed these actions
will seek to enhance the public welfare. 4 Ad hoc, uncontrolled
decisionmaking potentially interferes with broader public goals by
allowing decisions to be based on personal gain.
Second, courts and commentators have increasingly come to
recognize that piecemeal zoning changes, no matter what their
form, in essence involve a balancing of rights between landowners
and their neighbors. 42 Current practices, in which concrete zoning decisions are delayed for specific proposals, create legitimate
landowner expectations that reasonable opportunities for change
37. E.g., Lydo Enterprises v. City of Las Vegas, 745 F.2d 1211, 1213 (9th Cir. 1984);
Odell v. City of Eagen, 348 N.W.2d 792, 796 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984); Allen v. Town of North
Hempstead, 103 A.D.2d 144
478 N.Y.S.2d 919, 920 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984); C. WEAVER &
R. BABCOCK, supra note 3, at 270-71; Note, Federal Court Review of ArbitraryState Court
Decisions, 86 MICH. L. REV. 2010, 2044 (1988); Note, To Infer or Not to Infer A
DiscriminatoryPurpose:Rethinking Equal Protection Doctrine, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 334, 356
(1986).
38. C. WEAVER & R. BABCOCK, supra note 3, at 270-71.
39. For example, the Standard Zoning Enabling Act provides for variances when not
"contrary to the public interest." STANDARD ZONING ENABLING ACT § 7 (amended 1926).
40. Commentary critical of the current, ad hoc, piecemeal nature of zoning, with its
potential for abuse, is voluminous. E.g., R. BABCOCK, The Zoning Game 7-16 (1966);
Delogue, Local Land Use Controls: An Idea Whose Time Has Passed, 36 ME. L. REV. 261
(1984); Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines As Land
Use Controls, 40 U. CH1. L. REV. 681 (1973). See also Krasnowiecki, supra note 29, at 718.
41. Furtherance of the public welfare is a minimum goal imposed by the restraints of
substantive due process which has traditionally been held to require that zoning "be
substantially related to the health, safety, morals and welfare." Village of Euclid v. Amber
Realty, 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926).
42. E.g., Flemming v. City of Tacoma, 81 Wash. 2d 292,-_, 502 P.2d 327, 331 (1972); 1
N. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at § 1.01; Rose, supra note 7, at 841.
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exist.43 At the same time, however, the granting of change alters
pre-existing rights, often adversely affecting the interests of neighboring landowners. In this sense change decisions typically
involve the balancing of competing and significant interests, making it particularly important that they be handled in a fair manner.
Judicial attempts at addressing these concerns have met with
only limited success. Most notable have been calls for serious comprehensive plan consistency under which local comprehensive
plans would act as an external control on piecemeal rezoning decisions.4 4 Under this approach, plans would set pre-existing standards to which future changes must conform, thus controlling local
discretion.45 Although there has been some heightened interest in
recent years, only a very few states actually require serious plan
consistency.46 Moreover, zoning experts have increasingly come
to recognize the limits of planning and that effective planning necessarily requires substantial flexibility upon implementation.47
Partly for these reasons, courts and commentators have
argued for procedural reforms as one way to address the concerns
emanating from current practices. 48 Recognizing the entrenchment of zoning flexibility and to some degree ad hoc decisionmaking, commentators have argued that more attention needs to be
paid to the manner and process by which such decisions are
made.4 1 Procedural safeguards not only would insure the pres43. City of East Lake v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 682 (1976XStevens, J.,
dissenting). See C. WEAVER & R. BABCOCK, supra note 3, at 260. Landowner expectations
for reasonable opportunities for change are a natural consequence of "wait and see" zoning
practices which anticipate that concrete zoning decisions will occur in response to specific
proposals.
44. See generally Haar, In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan, 68 HARV. L. REV.
1154 (1955); Mandelker, The Role of the Comprehensive Plan in Land Use Regulation, 74
MICH. L. REV. 899 (1976); Sullivan v. Kressel, Twenty Years After - Renewed Significance
of the Comprehensive Plan Requirement, 9 URB. L. ANNUAL 33 (1975).
45. See, e.g., Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 264 Or. 574, __, 507 P.2d 23, 27
(1973Xplan adopted by planning commission and zoning ordinances are part of single,
integrated procedure); Baker v. City of Milwaukee, 271 Or. 500, -, 533 P.2d 772, 777
(1975Xcity has duty to conform zoning ordinances to comprehensive plan).
46. E.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65567 (West 1983Xno building permits may be issued, no
subdivision map approved, and no open-space zoning ordinance adopted unless consistent
with local plan).
47. See, e.g., C. WEAVER & R. BABCOCK, supra note 3, at 260-69; Rose, supra note 7, at
873-78 (arguing that a master plan cannot be the standard by which land use decisions are
measured).
48. See, e.g., Scott v. City of Indian Wells, 6 Cal. 3d 541, __, 492 P.2d 1137, 1142, 99
Cal. Rptr. 745, 750 (1972Xrequiring personal notice to owners of property adjacent to
planned development); Chrobuck v. Snohomish County, 78 Wash. 2d 858, _, 480 P.2d 489,
496 (1971Xrecognizing the right to cross-examination in zoning hearings); Kahn, supra note
3, at 1060 (concluding that courts should strictly enforce due process rights).
49. See, e.g., Tarlock, supra note 36, at 83-84 (approving the application of standard
due process doctrines to zoning); see generally C. WEAVER & R. BABCOCK, supra note 3, at
269-70 (discussing professionalization and procedural reform).
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ence of full information before decisionmakers, but would also
promote the legitimacy and acceptability of decisions by allowing
participation of landowners in the decisionmaking process.
Essential to any procedural reform is the need for controls on
the potential biases of zoning decisionmakers. Not only is the
assurance of some impartiality a fundamental control in itself, but
the efficacy of other procedural reforms are necessarily contingent
on some degree of impartiality. 50 At the same time, however, the
unique nature of zoning decisions, in particular their quasi-political nature, makes an analysis of controlling zoning bias problematic. The next subsection of this article will briefly examine the
particular importance of impartiality for zoning.
B.

THE VALUE OF IMPARTIALITY IN ZONING

The problem of biased decisionmaking is not unique to zoning
and can arise in almost any context. For this reason the threats
posed by bias and conflicts of interest have frequently been
examined, 51 often in the context of procedural due process
rights.5 2 Generally speaking, biased decisionmakers can be said to
raise two related concerns. First and most fundamental is that the
bias in question might distort or warp a decisionmaker's judgment. 53 Second, whether judgment is actually distorted or not,
bias can create a perception of unfairness and thus erode confi54
dence in the decisionmaking process.
The first concern, that biases might distort judgment, implicitly assumes that some results are preferable to others and that certain factors are inappropriate criteria in decisionmaking. In this
sense the concern that judgment not be distorted might be
broadly viewed as reflecting an "accuracy" interest since it reflects
50. As noted by Professor Redish, requirements of notice and hearings are of little
significance if the decisionmaker ultimately ignores any information before it. Redish &
Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of ProceduralDue Process, 95 YALE

L.J. 455, 476 (1986).
51. For a recent and excellent discussion of the rationales for controlling judicial bias,
see Leubsdorf, Theories of Judging and Judge Disqualification, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 237
(1987).
52. Substantial commentary has been devoted to the values underlying the right to

procedural due process. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

502-03

(1978); Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Dignity Theory, 61 B.U.L.
REv. 885 (1981); Michelman, Formal and AssociationalAims in ProceduralDue Process, in
DUE PROCESS 126 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1977).
53. Leubsdorf, supra note 51, at 240.
54. See, e.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986Xstate supreme court
justice's participation in case which resolved issues enhancing settlement value of justice's
own lawsuit violated due process); Cf. In re Murchinson, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955Xfairness in
criminal case requires absence of bias).
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a desire that proper decisions be reached.5 5 This does not assume
that clearly correct decisions can be identified; if that were the

case, erroneous decisions could be easily corrected by review procedures.56 Rather, concern for distorted judgment weighs heaviest when desired results are not easily identifiable but assumed to
exist nonetheless. 7
The notion of "desirable" or "improper" zoning decisions in
part depends on their type. The administrative variance and special-use decisions contemplate changes under established, though
often generalized, criteria. These procedures may require the
decisionmaker to consider the "public welfare" and/or determine
if "special circumstances" or "unnecessary hardship" exist.5 8 As
such, the ordinance contemplates a proper result will be reached if
the criteria are met. At the same time, however, such results are
often not easily identifiable because of the nature of the criteria,
and thus are subject to distorting influences.
The notion of "proper" rezoning decisions is necessarily different because of the lack of established criteria. Local governing
bodies commonly have substantial discretion in responding to
rezoning petitions. Nevertheless, their decisions are still premised
on determining what is best for public welfare. 59 Although this
properly allows for various policy biases, it assumes that the public
welfare will be more properly served by some substantive decisions than by others.
Importantly, current zoning practices also suggest an "accuracy" interest in properly resolving the competing interests of
landowners and neighbors in rezoning decisions. As previously
55. The "accuracy interest" in zoning decisions is comparable to what commentators
have described as instrumental or efficiency values supporting procedural due process
rights in general. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 52, at 503 (instrumental interest);
Developments in the Law- Zoning, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1427, 1505-07 (1978Xefficiency
interest).
56. See Leubsdorf, supra note 51, at 249.
57. Id.
58. Section 7 of the Standard Zoning Enabling Act, which has been adopted by most
states, provides for the granting of variances:
To authorize upon appeal in specific cases such variance from the terms of the
ordinance as will not be contrary to the public interest, where, owing to special
conditions, a literal enforcement of the provisions of the ordinance will result in
unnecessary hardship, and so that the spirit of the ordinance shall be observed
and substantial justice done.
STANDARD ZONING ENABLING ACT § 7 (amended 1926).

59. The traditional police power formulation for zoning is that zoning is invalid if it has
no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare." Village of
Euclid v. Amber Realty, 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926). Section 1 of the Standard Zoning
Enabling Act similarly provides that zoning is to be exercised "[f]or the purpose of
promoting health, safety, morals, or the general welfare of the community." STANDARD
ZONING ENABLING ACT §

1 (amended

1926).
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noted, current practices create expectations that opportunities for
change exist, while such change will usually adversely affect neighbors' interests. Although local governments necessarily have substantial discretion in how they balance such competing interests,
both landowners and neighbors have a legitimate interest that the
right decisions be reached. At the same time, however, the substantial discretion given local governments and the subtleties of
balancing mean that "proper" results are not easily identified.
The second primary concern posed by problems of zoning
bias and conflicts of interest is an erosion of public confidence in
zoning decisions. In one sense this concern is derivative of the

above accuracy rationale since presumably confidence would be
eroded only to the extent that a particular bias is perceived as
improperly influencing a decision. Yet courts have commonly
viewed this as a separate concern because of the need to perceive
government institutions as legitimate.6 0 It might therefore be
broadly viewed as a "legitimacy" interest.

Concern about erosion of confidence in zoning is particularly
relevant to current practices. Not only does zoning affect important interests in land, but the particularized nature of most decisions intensifies the perceptions of unfairness that might occur.
Moreover, the perceived "dealmaking" characteristics of current
practices raises substantial concern. Although this approach has
potential advantages over a more static planning ideal, it exacerbates perceived problems of unfairness when dealmaking is used
for personal gain. The specter of unequal treatment, favoritism,

and discrimination all resound more loudly when decisions are
made on an ad hoc basis. 6 '
60. Courts have frequently recognized the need to maintain public confidence in
zoning as an important reason for policing problems of bias and conflicts of interest. See,
e.g., Buell v. City of Bremerton, 80 Wash. 2d 518, __, 495 P.2d 1358, 1361 (1972); Low v.
Town of Madison, 135 Conn. 1, -, 60 A.2d 774, 777 (1948Xpublic office is public trust);
Aldom v. Borough of Roseland, 42 N.J. Super. 495, -, 127 A.2d 190, 193 (1956Xsame).
61. The "legitimacy" concern is arguably exacerbated by the lack of a coherent and
recognized theory behind zoning practice. Various commentators in recent years have
argued that the planning theory of zoning, long perceived as the theoretical justification for
the practice, is no longer valid to explain and legitimize what zoning does. These
commentators have noted that the current practice of particularized, responsive
decisionmaking cannot look to the older notion of planning, which was premised on longterm decisionmaking. Some of these commentators have suggested that zoning in turn
should be radically modified or eliminated altogether. See generally Ellickson, supra note
40; Delogue, supra note 40 (addressing why unsatisfactory land use control powers should
be withdrawn from municipalities); Krasnowiecki, supra note 29 (arguing that zoning as it
presently exists is a false concept and the system needs to be reformed); Kmiec,
DeregulatingLand Use: An Alternative Free EnterpriseDevelopment System, 130 U. PA. L.
REV. 28 (1981Xconcluding that present zoning controls should be replaced by an alternative
system allowing for private decisions). Other commentators, while recognizing that the
traditional planning theory fails to support current zoning practices, have offered
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The two primary concerns posed by biased decisionmakers the potential for distorted judgment and the threat to institutional
legitimacy - are thus highly relevant to current zoning practices.
This does not mean that all forms of bias or interest should be
avoided. Not only is that impossible, but the above accuracy and
legitimacy concerns are only threatened by those influencing factors considered extraneous to proper decisionmaking. As will be
discussed later, certain biases, such as those regarding community
development, might be relevant criteria in decisionmaking. Yet to
the extent some biases are inappropriate to decisions, most notably
those flowing from personal interest, the current nature of zoning
decisions makes it important that they be controlled.
II.

LEGAL BASIS FOR REGULATING BIAS AND
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

The previous section demonstrates the substantial interests
served by regulating bias and conflicts of interest in zoning.
Unlike notice and hearing requirements, however, impartiality
requirements find only a limited basis in statutory law. Moreover,
courts, in reviewing conflict of interest challenges, frequently fail
to articulate the precise basis on which the conflict is regulated. It
is therefore important to examine the possible grounds for regulating bias and conflicts of interest in zoning.
There are several potential sources providing a basis for regulating bias and conflicts of interest in zoning decisions. First, of
course, are the zoning ordinances themselves or other local ordinances. Such ordinances, in addition to providing substantive
restrictions on property use, usually provide procedural safeguards
for zoning changes. Although focusing primarily on notice and
hearing requirements, ordinances often include conflict of interest
provisions. Moreover, local ordinances might have general ethic
provisions which bear on zoning decisions.6 2
In the absence of local regulation courts have looked to several other sources as authority to police problems of bias and conflicts of interest in zoning. First, some states have statutory
alternative theories to explain and legitimize zoning. See, e.g., Rose, supra note 7, at 893910 (justifying piecemeal zoning under "mediation theory"). See generally Nelson, A
Private Property Theory of Zoning, 11 URB. LAW 713 (1979Xprivate property theory).
62. Zagoreos v. Conklin, 109 A.D.2d 281, __, 491 N.Y.S.2d 358, 362-63 (1985). In
addition to local motivation, some state statutes require local governments to adopt conflict
of interest ordinances pursuant to state guidelines. See ALASKA STAT. § 29-20.010 (1986).
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provisions which apply to zoning decisions.6 3 Although only a few
explicitly relate to zoning, a number of states have more generalized provisions which would include within their reach zoning
decisions.6 4 Importantly, these usually include rezoning decisions
by local legislative bodies as well as decisions by appointed boards.
Second, in the absence of state statutes regulating conflicts,
state courts have used a variety of means to control problems of
bias, often looking to common law or administrative law principles
to control self-interested decisionmaking. 5 In doing so, courts
have usually limited protections to what are considered quasi-judicial rather than legislative decisions. For this reason, variance and
special-use decisions, considered administrative in nature, are typically subject to regulation 66 while rezonings, considered legislative
in nature, have not been. The next two subsections of this article
will briefly review potential statutory and nonstatutory grounds
for regulation.
A.

STATUTORY PROVISIONS

1.

Specific Zoning Regulations

Although state statutes regulate local officials in a variety of
ways, only a few states have statutes which specifically address
conflicts of interest in zoning decisions. These can be broken into
two groups. First, three states - Indiana, New Jersey, and New
Hampshire - have statutes which prohibit members of a planning
commission or board of adjustment from participating in hearings
in which they have a direct or indirect substantial interest. 68 The
statutory prohibitions are thus limited to what are traditionally
considered adjudicative bodies.
Broader regulations of zoning conflicts are found in Virginia,
New York, and Connecticut where legislative as well as adjudicative zoning decisions are specifically regulated.6 9 The most comprehensive of these statutes is Connecticut's where conflicts of
63. For a discussion of state statutes which apply to zoning decisions, see infra notes
68-77 and accompanying text.
64. For a discussion of state statutes which can be construed to apply to zoning
decisions, see infra notes 84-94 and accompanying text.
65. For a discussion of judicially-imposed restrictions for controlling bias in zoning
decisions, see infra notes 95-110 and accompanying text.
66. See infra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
67. See infra notes 97-98, 103-04 and accompanying text.
68. See IND. CODE ANN. §§ 36-7-4-223, 36-7-4-909 (Burns 1989Xplanning commission
and board of adjustments); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40-55D-23(bXWest Supp. 1988Xplanning
board); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 673.14 (Supp. 1988Xzoning board of adjustment, building
code board, planning board or historic district commission).
69. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-639.1 (1987) (state and local government conflict of interest
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interest in zoning are regulated in some detail. The statute pro-

hibits members of zoning bodies from representing persons of
firms with business before the body and also from participating in
any hearing or decision in which the member is directly or indirectly interested in a personal or financial sense.7 ° Although the
71
statute itself is ambiguous regarding what decisions it applies to,
Connecticut courts have applied it to any zoning decision,
whether by a legislative7 2 or administrative body. 3
Although differing in the type of zoning decisions regulated,
these specific zoning statutes generally reflect the common-law
principle that public officials should not participate in decisions in
which they have a personal interest.7 4 Courts have interpreted
their scope as reaching both pecuniary and nonpecuniary conflicts.
Even New York's statute, which specifies four prohibited conflicts, 75 has been interpreted by its courts as reflecting a principle
which justifies regulation of nonspecified conflicts.7 6 In this sense,
these statutes provide a significant basis for regulation of various
types of bias and conflicts which pose a threat to impartial
decisionmaking.

2. General Conflict of Interest Provisions
Although few statutes specifically address zoning conflicts of
interest issues, a number of states have more general statutes
applicable to many zoning situations. Extreme instances of abuse
potentially fall within various criminal actions such as bribery and
act); N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 809(2Xa-d) (McKinney 1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-11
(West 1986).
70. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-11 (West 1986).

71. The Connecticut statute provides that
[n]o member of any zoning commission or board and no member of any board of
appeals or of any municipal agency exercising the powers of any zoning
commission or board of appeals . . . shall appear for or represent any person,
firm, corporation or other entity in any matter pending before the planning or
zoning commission or board or said board of appeals or any agency exercising
the powers of any such commission or board in the same municipality....
Id. Thus, the statute does not clearly include within its reach local legislative acts.
72. Dana-Robin Corp. v. Common Council, 166 Conn. 207, -, 348 A.2d 560, 563
(1974).
73. Ferguson v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 29 Conn. Supp. 31,
, 269 A.2d 857, 860
(1970).
74. See, e.g., Piggott v. Borough of Hopewell, 22 N.J. Super. 106, -, 91 A.2d 667, 669
(1952Xa member of a governmental body who has a direct personal interest in a matter
before the body may not vote); Pratt v. Luther, 45 Ind. 250, 255 (1873Xtrustee of town
cannot act as both vendor and vendee in sale of land to town).
75. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 809(2Xa-dXMcKinney 1986).
76. See Tuxedo Conservation & Taxpayers Ass'n v. Town Board, 96 Misc. 2d 1, _, 408
N.Y.S.2d 668, 673 (1978Xlist of conflicts in statute sets forth only those situations in which
conflict of interest is conclusively presumed).
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corruption, which certainly might arise in zoning situations.7 8
Similarly, most states provide for the removal of zoning officials in

cases of malfeasance, nonfeasance, or for engaging in various other
types of misconduct.7 9
More relevant for most instances of bias and conflict of interest in zoning are various conflict of interest or government ethic
provisions regulating the behavior of public officials. These provisions, often the result of relatively recent conflict of interest statutes, typically regulate local as well as state officials. 8 °
Importantly, the ethics provisions extend to local legislative officials, an aspect of regulation with only limited recognition in the
common law. 8 '
Although the ethics statutes vary considerably, they can be
grouped into two broad categories. First are those statutes which
prohibit specific types of conflicts which would not appear to apply
to zoning decisions. Most notable in this regard are statutes which
place prohibitions on local officials contracting to provide goods or
services to their governments.8 2 Similar provisions also restrict
77. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1201 (1987Xperson is guilty of bribery when he
offers, confers, or agrees to offer a personal benefit upon a public servant); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 722.1-2 (West 1979Xa person who offers, promises, or gives anything of value or benefit to
a person engaged in a public capacity commits a felony).
78. Zoning is often viewed as an area of government ripe for potential corruption
because of the significant financial impact of many zoning decisions and the low-paying or
non-paying position of many zoning decisionmakers. Indeed, studies have indicated that
substantial corruption often exists. See generally J. GARDINER & T. LYMAN, DECISIONS FOR
SALE: CORRUPTION AND REFORM IN LAND-USE AND BUILDING REGULATION (1978); .
AMICK, THE AMERICAN WAY OF GRAFT 77-94 (1976).

79. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-461.02 (1977Xstating planning commission
creation, limitations and removal to be provided by local ordinance); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 31-23-203(3Xl986Xdirecting means of zoning commission members' removal for
misconduct); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 22, § 701 (1987Xstating planning commission members
may be removed for cause after hearing by majority vote).
80. Cf. ALA. CODE § 36-25 (1977 & Supp. 1988Xcode of ethics for all governmental
officials and employees); N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW §§ 800-809 (McKinney 1986Xprohibiting
conflicts of interest of municipal officers and employees); N.Y. PUB. OFF. § 74 (McKinney
1988Xcode of ethics for state officers and employees).
81. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 89-953 (Harrison 1987Xstating code of ethics for public
officers and employees); MD. ANN. CODE art. 40, § 3-101 (1986Xregulating local officials and
employees regarding conflict of interest).
82. About twenty-five states have some specific prohibition on local public officials
contracting to provide services or goods to their respective governmental bodies. These in
most instances would apply to elected and appointed officials. For examples of these
prohibitions, see MISS. CONST., art. IV, § 109; ALA. CODE §§ 11-3-5 & 11-43-53 (1975XIocal
officials directly or indirectly involved in contracting for work or services shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 1090 (West 1980Xcity officers shall not be financially
interested in any contract made by them in their official capacity); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 24, T
3-14-4 (1988) & ch. 38, 102-03 (Smith-Hurd 1988Xno municipal officer shall be interested
in any contract when the expense is paid from the treasury or by any assessment levied by
any ordinance); IOWA CODE ANN. § 362.5 (1976Xa city officer shall not have an interest in
any contract to be furnished or performed for his city); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4304
(1984Xno public officer shall participate in the making of a contract with any business in
which he or she has a substantial interest); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 61.250 (Michie/Bobbs-

1989]

ZONING DECISIONMAKING

177

business transactions and other forms of association. 3 Although
such provisions place important restrictions on local officials, zoning decisions do not fit within the type of business activity contemplated by such statutes. Indeed, no precedent exists for extending
such specific, business-related prohibitions to zoning decisions.
The second broad category of conflict of interest statutes are
those with more general prohibitions on conflicts that should be
read as applying to zoning decisions. Although once again varying
considerably in the language used, at least nineteen states have
statutes which prohibit local officials from acting on issues in which
they or some associate are financially interested. 84 Arizona has a
Merrill 1986Xno first-class city officers shall be interested in any contract with the city as
principal or surety); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 268A, § 3 (West Supp. 1989Xlocal officials
contracting to provide goods or services to their government shall be punished by a fine of
not more than three thousand dollars or by imprisonment for not more than two years, or
both); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 46.30(3) (West 1987Xno member of the board of
supervisors shall be interested in any contract or other business transaction with any county
during the time for which he is elected); MINN. STAT. §§ 412.311, 382.18 (1988Xno county
official shall be directly or indirectly interested in any contract, work, labor or business to
which the county is a party); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 105.458 (Vernon 1989Xno member of any
governing body shall engage in business transactions or perform any service for any
political subdivision for consideration); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 49-14, 102, 103 (1984Xno public
employee shall enter into a contract valued at two thousand dollars or more with a
governmental body); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 245.075, 268.384 (Michie Supp. 1987Xit is
unlawful for any county officer to be interested in any contract made by him in the
discharge of his official duties); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49-A:82 (1970Xno elective or
appointive officer of the city shall take part in a decision concerning city business in which
he has a financial interest); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:126-3 (West 1967Xall contracts in which a
councilman shall be interested shall be null and void); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 11-09-47, 40-1305 (1985Xno local officer shall be interested in any contract to which the county is a party,
either as principal, surety, or otherwise); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 1806 (Purdon 1956Xno
elected or appointed county officer shall be personally interested in any contract to which
the county is a party); S.C. CODE ANN. § 5-7-130 (Law Co-op. 1976Xany municipal officer
having a substantial financial interest in any business which contracts with the municipality
shall refrain from participating in his capacity as city officer in matters related thereto); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 6-1-1 (1981Xit shall be unlawful for any local officer to be interested
in any contract entered into by that county or municipality); TENN. CODE ANN. § 12-4-101
(1987Xlocal officials are prohibited from having any personal interest in any contract
entered into with the municipality or county); WYO. STAT. § 16-6-118 (1982Xit is unlawful
for any local officeholders to have a personal interest in any contract entered into with the
city).
83. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 29.20.010 (1986Xmunicipal officials may not participate in
official actions in which they have a substantial financial interest); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 1126
(West 1980 & Supp. 19 89Xlocal officers shall not engage in any activity for compensation
which is in conflict with the responsibilities of their appointing power); MD. ANN. CODE, art.
40A, § 6-201(bX1986 & Supp. 1988Xregulations applied to state officials regarding
prevention of conflicts of financial interests also apply to local officials).
84. See ALA. CODE § 11-43-54 (1977Xprohibits councilmen from deciding issues where
special financial interest exists); ALASKA STAT. § 29.20.010 (1986Xprohibits members of
governing bodies and other officials from participating in decisions in which they have a
substantial financial interest); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-222 (19 7 7 Xsupervisor cannot vote
on a measure in which he or a family member is pecuniarily interested); ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 21-8-304 (1987Xpublic officials or state employees cannot use office to advance personal
interests except incidental); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 112.3143 (West 1982 & Supp.
1989Xrequiring public officers to disclose interests within 15 days of vote); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 36-30-6 (Harrison 1987Xillegal for a council member to vote on any matter in which
he/she is personally interested); IDAHO CODE § 67-65-06 (1980Xprohibits participation by
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typical statute which provides that "[a] supervisor shall not vote
upon any measure in which he, any member of his family or his
partner is pecuniarily interested." 5 Similarly, a Georgia statute
provides that it is illegal for the member of a city council to vote
on any matter in which he is personally interested.8 6
The general regulatory nature of provisions such as these
makes them clearly applicable to zoning decisions. Importantly, in
all instances these provisions apply to decisions by legislative bodies, such as rezoning, which have often been viewed as immune
from regulation. Indeed, many of these general conflict of interest
prohibitions only specify governing bodies without specific language relating to appointed administrative bodies such as planning
commissions or boards of adjustment.87 This in part might be
explained by the presumption that the later are already governed
under administrative law principles.
As of yet, relatively few cases have been generated pursuant
to many of these statutes, 8 and therefore, the precise scope of
their regulation is uncertain. Generally, however, they are primarily concerned with financial or pecuniary interests in decisionmaking. Some statutes only prohibit the decisionmaker from
members of governing boards or committees in matters in which there is an economic
interest by self or by relations); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 2251(1X1978 & Supp.
1988Xmunicipal and county votes are voidable if any participating municipal, county or
quasi-municipal official had a direct or indirect pecuniary interest); MD. ANN. CODE art.
40A, § 3-101 (1986Xprohibits public officials from participating in matters in which they
have a conflict of interest); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 105.462 (Vernon Supp. 1989Xprohibits
members of local agencies from participating in decisions, including zoning, which may
result in direct financial benefit); MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-2-125(bX1987Xprohibits an officer
or employee of local government from participating in official acts in which he has a direct
and substantial financial interest); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3-10-5 (1985Xany member of a
governing board having any possible financial interest in any policy or decision is required
to disclose matters); OR. REV. STAT. § 244.120(1Xa) (1987Xrequiring elected public officials
other than legislators to announce potential conflicts prior to acting thereon); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 36-14-7 (Supp. 1984Xan interest is in conflict with discharge of duties if official will
derive a direct monetary gain or suffer a direct monetary loss by reason of his/her official
action); S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-13-410 (Law. Co-op. 1986Xno municipal official or employee
shall use his/her position for financial gain); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 19.46 (West 1986Xno public
official shall take official action on any matter in which he/she has a substantial financial
interest).
85. AMIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11.222 (1987).

86. GA. CODE ANN. § 69-204 (Harrison 1976).
87. See, e.g., Amz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-222 (1987Xmember of county board of
supervisors cannot vote on measure in which he or his family is pecuniarily interested); GA.
CODE ANN. § 69-204 (Harrison 1976Xillegal for council member to vote on any matter in
which he/she is personally interested). In other instances the language of the statutes is
more broadly written so as to apply to both elected and appointed officials. See, e.g.,
ALASKA STAT. § 29.20.010 (1986Xgoverning body members, and employees or officials
other than members of the governing body, may not participate in official actions in which
they have a financial interest); MD. ANN. CODE art. 40A, § 3-101 (1986Xregulates public
officials).
88. The lack of case law dealing with the general ethics statutes is in part attributable
to the relatively recent enactment of many of these conflict of interest statutes.
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having substantial or direct financial interests, 8 9 while others prohibit direct and indirect financial interests. 90 Other statutes spe-

cifically include within their reach not only the decisionmaker's
own financial interests, but also those of his family 9 and in some
cases business relationships. 92 Finally, some statutes prohibit "per93
sonal" interests rather than or in addition to financial interests,
or they merely prohibit "conflicts of interest.
B.

94

LIMITATIONS ON QUASI-JUDICIAL DECISIONS

In the absence of statutory provisions, courts have still
imposed impartiality requirements on decisions deemed administrative or quasi-judicial as opposed to legislative. For this reason
members of zoning boards of adjustments or comparable lay bodies deciding variance and special-use requests have typically been
held to standards of impartiality95 because of the perceived administrative nature of such decisions.96 Similarly, those courts viewing
rezonings as adjudicative rather than legislative have also applied
89. See ALA. CODE § 11-43-54 (1975Xprohibits having a "special financial interest");
ALASKA STAT. § 29.20.010 (1986Xprohibits having a "substantial financial interest"); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 8-13-410 (Law. Co-op. 1986Xprohibits deriving a "financial gain"); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 19.46 (West 1986Xprohibits having a "substantial financial interest").
90. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 2251(1) (1978 & Supp. 1988Xprohibits direct and
indirect pecuniary interest); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 105.462 (Vernon 1988Xprohibits
participation by member where decision may result in direct financial gain or loss to him).
91. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-222 (1977Xmember of board of county supervisors
shall not vote upon any measure in which he, any member of his family or his partner, is
pecuniarily interested); IDAHO CODE § 67-6506 (1980Xregulates the economic interest of
members of the governing board, their relatives, employer, and employees).
92. See IDAHO CODE § 67-6506 (198OXstatute includes employers and employees of the
decisionmaker within the category of persons who cannot participate when they have a
financial interest).
93. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-11 (West 1987Xprohibits participating when there
is a direct or indirect, personal or financial interest); GA. CODE ANN. § 69-204 (Harrison
Supp. 1988Xprohibits participation when it concerns a matter "in which [the decisionmaker
is] personally interested").
94. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 36-14-4 (1984Xprohibits participation when there is a
"substantial conflict of interest").
95. See, e.g., Montgomery County Bd. of Appeals v. Walker, 228 Md. 574, _, 180 A.2d
865, 868 (1962Xpresence of interested party on planning commission violated appearance
of fairness doctrine); Kremer v. City of Plainfield, 101 N.J. Super. 346, -, 244 A.2d 335, 338
(1968Xzoning board of adjustment member whose nephew was partner in law firm
representing applicant disqualified); Narrowsview Preservation Ass'n v. City of Tacoma, 84
Wash. 2d 416, -, 526 P.2d 897, 901 (1974Xappearance of fairness doctrine violated by vice
chairman of planning commission who was employed by bank which held security on
zoning petitioner's land). See generally P. ROHAN, supra note 19, at § 51.06[2].
96. See, e.g., State ex rel. McNary v. Hais, 670 S.W.2d 494, 496 (Mo. 1984XCounty
Council's issuance of conditional use permit is a quasi-judicial decision); Rogoff v. Tufariello,
106 N.J. Super. 303, -., 255 A.2d 781, 785 (1969Xboard of adjustment hearing on variance
request is quasi-judicial). See generally D. Hagman, supra note 19, at 166-68 (discussing
administrative relief); D. MANDELKER, supra note 2, at § 6.66 (citing cases in which bias
was alleged).
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standards of impartiality.9 7 As will be discussed later, however,
most courts have declined to extend such protections to rezonings
because of their perceived legislative nature. 98
Although courts have consistently extended protection to
administrative decisions, they have varied in their articulation of
the grounds for the requirement and often fail to state the precise
legal basis entirely. A close reading of the cases, however, suggests
several potential rationales for imposing an impartiality requirement on quasi-judicial decisionmakers.
First, in some instances courts have relied on common-law
constraints on public officials. The common law has long imposed
a duty on local officials to avoid acting where private interests conflicted with public duties.9 9 This has most frequently been applied
to transactions, such as contracts, between a local government and
a public
official in which there was an opportunity for personal
1
gain. 00 In prohibiting such actions, courts have at times charac-

terized a public office as a public trust giving rise to a fiduciary
relationship. 101

This common-law duty against conflicts of interest has been
used on several occasions to police personal interests in zoning
decisions. This has usually occurred with regard to decisions per10 2
ceived as quasi-judicial in nature, such as variance decisions.
Although the common-law prohibitions against conflicts of interest
have typically not applied to rezonings because of their perceived
97. See, e.g., Flemming v. City of Tacoma, 81 Wash. 2d. 292, -, 502 P.2d 327, 331-32
(1972Xrezoning decision quasi-judicial requiring impartial decisionmaker).
98. See, e.g., Schauer v. City of Miami Beach, 112 So. 2d 838, 840 (Fla. 1959Xmotivation
behind a councilman's vote is not a subject for judicial inquiry); Anthony v. City of
Kewanee, 79 Ill. App. 2d 243, -, 223 N.E.2d 738, 740 (1967Xfact that council acted from
motives of self-interest did not invalidate rezoning ordinance); Fiser v. City of Knoxville,
584 S.W.2d 659, 663 (Tenn. App. 1979Xrefusal of city council zoning decision not necessary
despite personal or political interest of members); Blankenship v. City of Richmond, 188 Va.
97
49 S.E.2d 321, 323 (1948Xcouncil member who does not act impartially is answerable
to voters, not the courts). See also D. MANDELKER, supra note 2, at § 6.66 (courts generally
do not apply bias and conflict of interest standards to zoning decisions by local legislative
bodies).
99. E.g., Anderson v. City of Parsons, 209 Kan. 337, -, 496 P.2d 1333, 1337 (1972);
Pratt v. Luther, 45 Ind. 250, 255 (1873). See generally Freilich & Larson, Conflicts of
Interest: A Model Statutory Proposalfor the Regulation of Municipal Transactions, 38
UMKC L. REV. 373, 378-83 (1970Xdiscussing impact of common law standards regarding
conflict of interest on current statutory law).
100. See, e.g., Smith v. City of Albany, 61 N.Y. 444, 446 (1875Xpayment to person, who
was member of city council which approved payment, for services rendered declared void
and against public policy); Blankenship v. City of Richmond, 188 Va. 97, 99, 49 S.E.2d 321,
323 (1948Xnoting in dictum common-law principle prohibiting municipal official from
contracting with municipality for personal gain).
101. E.g., Aldom v. Borough of Roseland, 42 N.J. Super. 495, __ 127 A.2d 190, 193
(1956).
102. See Piggott v. Borough of Hopewell, 22 N.J. Super. 106, __ 91 A.2d 667, 669
(1952Xstandards of impartiality apply to variance decision).
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legislative nature, 10 3 a few courts have extended prohibition to
rezoning decisions. Several have done this by characterizing
small-scale rezonings as quasi-judicial rather than legislative acts,

and thus subject to the common-law prohibitions. 10 4 At least one

court, however, has held that even if rezonings are labeled quasi-

legislative, the common-law prohibitions should still apply because
of the important policy concerns implicated.1 0 5
A second basis used by courts to impose impartiality requirements are due process constraints implicit in statutory require-

ments for notice and hearings for quasi-judicial decisions. Two of
the leading state courts in terms of requiring impartial deci-

sionmakers, Washington and Oregon, have both found such a
requirement implicit in the statutory hearing requirement. In
Chrobuck v. Snohomish County 10 6 the Washington Supreme
Court held that implicit in the statutory requirement of a quasijudicial hearing is that decisionmakers be impartial and avoid the
appearance of unfairness.' 0 7 Similarly, the Oregon Supreme
Court in Fasano v. Washington County Commissioners10 8 found
implicit in statutory hearing requirements certain adjudicatory
safeguards, including the right to an impartial decisionmaker.' 0 9
Such an inference of impartial decisionmakers from a statutory scheme is logical based upon the importance of impartiality in
fulfilling the purposes behind notice and hearing requirements.
As suggested earlier, the efficacy of such requirements are necessarily contingent on a decisionmaker's willingness to consider relevant information and opinions presented at the hearing. Thus,
103. See Freilich & Larson, supra note 99, at 379.
104. Aldom, 42 N.J. Super. at -, 127 A.2d at 197; Low v. Town of Madison, 135 Conn.
1, __, 60 A.2d 774, 778 (1948).
105. Olley Valley Estates, Inc. v. Fussell, 232 Ga. 779, -, 208 S.E.2d 801, 803 (1974).
106. 78 Wash. 2d 858, 480 P.2d 489 (1971).
107. Chrobuck v. Snohomish County, 78 Wash. 2d 858, -, 480 P.2d 489, 496 (1971).
See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 36.70.040 (1964) (planning commission shall conduct such
hearings as are required by chapter 36.70). Although the court's holding in Chrobuck
might be construed as being constitutionally based, the Washington Supreme Court has
since clearly stated that its requirement of impartial decisionmakers for quasi-judicial
hearings is not constitutionally based, but instead is based upon the implicit requirement of
a fair and impartial decisionmaker from the Washington statutory scheme. City of Bellevue
v. King County Boundary Rev. Bd., 90 Wash. 2d 856, __, 586 P.2d 470, 475 (1978).
108. 264 Or. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973).
109. Fasano v. Washington County Comm'rs, 264 Or. 574, -, 507 P.2d 23, 30 (1973).
See OR. REV. STAT. § 215.060 (notice and hearing provisionX1987). The court in Fasano
itself did not clearly articulate the precise basis for the imposition of due process safeguards
flowing from quasi-judicial zoning decisions. In subsequent decisions, however, the Oregon
Supreme Court clarified its holding in Fasano and stated that the due process safeguards,
including an impartial decisionmaker, were not constitutionally based but instead were
implied by the Oregon statutory scheme. 1000 Friends of Oregon v. Wasco County Court,
304 Or. 76, -, 742 P.2d 39, 42 (1987); Neuberger v. City of Portland, 288 Or. 155, -, 603
P.2d 771, 774 (1979).
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imposing suitable fairness requirements is a reasonable statutory
interpretation, at least where the hearing is viewed as quasijudicial.
Finally, some courts have alluded to the "due process" or
"procedural" requirements of administrative or quasi-judicial
decisions, suggesting a possible constitutional basis.1 1 0 The United
States Supreme Court typically determines what process is due
through a balancing test in which a court must consider three distinct factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of
such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail."1 '
However, the Court has consistently held that the provision of
a fair and impartial decisionmaker is also a basic requirement of
due process."12 The Court has applied this not only in judicial set4
tings,"13 but also in quasi-judicial administrative contexts. "1
Despite the established right to impartial decisionmakers as a
constitutional due process right, courts have rarely examined the
applicability of federal due process protections to zoning decisions.
At least since 1972 the Supreme Court has given a somewhat technical rather than a broad-based interpretation to due process, premising any protections upon there having first been established
the deprivation of a property interest." 5 This means that not
every government decision adversely affecting an individual triggers due process, but only those touching upon one of the specific
listed rights. Moreover, in defining property rights the Court has
110. See Abrahamson v. Wendell, 72 Mich. App. 80, __, 249 N.W.2d 302, 304
(1976Xciting Barkey v. Nick, 11 Mich. App. 381, __, 161 N.W.2d 445, 447 (1968)).
111. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976Xciting Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254, 263-71 (1970)).
112. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46 (1975); In re Murchinson, 349 U.S. 133, 136
(1955).
113. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813,821-22 (1986); Withrow v. Larkin, 421
U.S. 35, 46 (1975); Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 61-62 (1972); In re
Murchinson, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927).
114. Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 578-79 (1973).
115. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972Xinitial inquiry is whether
there is deprivation of liberty or property interest). See generally Monaghan, Of "Liberty"
and "Property",62 CORNELL L. REV. 405 (1977Xexamining the content of the concepts of
liberty and property).
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consistently noted that the Constitution itself does not create
property interests, but instead they must stem from independent
sources such as state law."' Thus, only those interests created by
the state itself suffice to trigger procedural due process protection.
At first glance this technical approach to what interests trigger
due process protection might not appear to pose a problem with
zoning decisions because of the long recognized "property"
nature of interests in land." 7 Indeed, the historical recognition of
land as the quintessential property might explain the relatively little case analysis of whether zoning affects property interests for
purposes of due process. Yet zoning does not eliminate or deprive
the underlying interest in real property; rather, it regulates the
use of land. Thus, the core property nature of the land being regulated does not necessarily mean that any zoning decision affecting
such land constitutes a deprivation of "property."
The Court's current approach to due process analysis was
established in the companion cases of Board of Regents v. Roth 8
and Perry v. Sindermann 9 in 1972. The Court had previously
extended procedural due process protection to such newly recognized property interests as an entitlement to welfare benefits and
a driver's license.' 20 In Roth, however, the Court set an important
limitation on future recognitions. Premising its discussion on the
fact that only those interests qualifying as "liberty or property" are
entitled to due process protection,' 2 ' the Court stressed that property interests are not created by the constitution but "by existing
rules or understandings that stem from an independent source
such as state law.....122 In Roth the plaintiff, David Roth,
accepted a teaching position at a state university for a fixed term of
116. E.g., Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 441 (1979); Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v.
Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 9 (1978); Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.
117. There is no doubt that interests in real property or land qualify as property
interests under the due process clause. The United States Supreme Court itself, in
analyzing whether particular public entitlements qualify as property, has referred to
interests in land as the traditional notion of what constitutes "property." Roth, 408 U.S. at
571-72.
118. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
119. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
120. Recognition of public benefits as constituting a form of "new property" was first
recognized in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970). In Goldberg the Court held that
a state could not terminate public assistance payments to a particular recipient without
some due process protection. Id. at 266. Although the State in Goldberg stipulated that the
payments were a form of "property" under the due process clause, Justice Brennan's
opinion went out of its way to note that such payments constitute property. Id. at 262. The
next year in Bell v. Burson, the Court similarly recognized a property interest in a driving
license requiring procedural protections prior to suspension of the license. 402 U.S. 535,
539 (1971).
121. Roth, 408 U.S. at 569-70.
122. Id. at 577.
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one academic year.' 2 3 Roth completed the term but was informed
that his appointment would not be renewed.' 2 4 Since Roth did
not have tenure, 2 5 no reason was given for the decision and there
was no opportunity for him to challenge it in a hearing. 2 6 Roth
subsequently brought an action in a federal court, alleging that the
lack of a hearing in this context constituted a deprivation of his
27
right to procedural due process.'
The Court noted that the terms of Roth's appointment
expressly limited the term of his employment to one year and did
not provide for any right of renewal. 128 In addition, the Court
stressed that there were no state statutes or university rules or policies which would create an interest or expectation in reemployment.' 29 °Therefore, since there was no property interest in
reemployment in this context, 3 ° the Court held that Roth was not
deprived of his due process rights by not being granted a
hearing. 131
In Perry, however, the Court found a "property" interest in
continuing employment. The claimant in Perry suffered a similar
lack of express rights under his contract, but established that there
was a type of "de facto" tenure program at the school. 1 3 2 This provided a sufficient basis for a claim to entitlement, based on mutual
understandings and expectations, to constitute a property
33
interest. 1
Roth and Perry established the Court's current approach
which premises due process analysis on a technical definition of
property. 3 4 Although recognizing that no easy formula for prop123. Id. at 566.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 567-68.
127. Id. at 568-69.
128. Id. at 578.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 579.
132. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 600, 602 (1972).
133. Id. at 601-02.
134. Some commentators have suggested that prior to Roth and Perry the Court
employed a broad-based definition of "life, liberty, and property" as "embracing all
interests valued by sensible men," and thus viewed the technical approach of Roth as
representing a sharp break with the past. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 19
(1980Xcriticizing the Court's liberty or property interest analysis as making the Court look
"silly"); Monaghan, supra note 113, at 409 (the "life, liberty or property" clause of the
fourteenth amendment does not embrace the full range of state conduct which seriously
impacts upon individual interests). This characterization has in turn been challenged by
others. See, e.g., Simon, Liberty and Property in the Supreme Court: A Defense of Roth and
Perry, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 146 (1983).
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erty is available, 135 the Court focused on the concept of "entitlement," stating that property interests are those to which one has a
"legitimate claim of entitlement.' 1 3 6 The Court noted that this
entitlement is a creation of the state and can arise from either
express rules or mutual understanding, 1 37 or from custom as in
Perry.138 Conversely, abstract needs or desires and unilateral
1 39
expectations fail to create property interests.
The triggering of due process protection in zoning therefore
requires recognition of an entitlement which is adversely affected
by the zoning decision. Although the underlying interest in the
land itself qualifies as a property interest, as previously noted zoning cannot be viewed as a deprivation of that traditional form of
property. Instead, a due process analysis needs to focus on what
extent recognized entitlements would be removed by zoning.
This, of course, should turn on the particular decision being made
and the nature of the affected interest.
The clearest case for a deprivation of a recognized property
interest concerns a landowner's interest when a zoning decision,
such as a rezoning, will make the land use designation more
restrictive, thereby eliminating previous use rights. For example,
where land previously zoned commercial is rezoned residential,
thus eliminating the more intensive and often more desirable
commercial use, there seems to be a clear deprivation of a property entitlement. Although the fee simple interest remains, the
landowner's right to develop and use the property for commercial
purposes clearly meets the entitlement standard under Roth and
Perry. Both the explicit provisions of the zoning ordinance and
the understanding of the40parties indicate an entitlement deserving
due process protection.
135. Perry, 408 U.S. at 601 (" 'property' interests for procedural due process are not
limited by a few rigid, technical forms").
136. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972); Perry, 408 U.S. at 601.
137. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577; Perry, 408 U.S. at 601-02. The Court in Both emphasized
the need not to undermine reliance upon mutual understandings as a means of creating a
property interest. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577. Subsequent to its decisions in Roth and Perry the
court has continued to focus on state created entitlements based on rules and
understandings as creating property interests. See, e.g., Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc.
v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980Xthe dimensions of property interests stemming from
state law are defined by the constitution); Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 441 (1979Xfederal
constitution does not create property interests but rather extends procedural safeguards
concerning interests stemming from independent sources); Memphis Light, Gas & Water
Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 9 (1978Xfederal law will determine whether an individual has a
"legitimate claim of entitlement" based upon "an independent-source such as state law").
138. See Perry, 408 U.S. at 602 (an unwritten "common law" in a particular university
may create the equivalent of tenure).
139. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.
140. The particular property interest at stake can be characterized in several different
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A more problematic analysis is presented when a landowner
seeks a zoning change through a variance, special-use permit, or
rezoning to a less restrictive use. Such changes might be perceived as increasing or enhancing his use possibilities. Although
the right to seek these various changes might be established by
ordinance or custom, the lack of a present right to the required
use might be viewed as a lack of interest. As such, in each of these
contexts an adverse decision arguably does not deprive an owner
of a property interest, but instead is simply a denial of additional
interests.
This position finds some support in a footnote in City of
Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises14 in which the United States
Supreme Court examined whether a zoning ordinance which subjected all rezonings to approval by referendum violated due process. 4 2 The Court upheld the ordinance, apparently assuming
due process rights were implicated, but found that the referendum process could not be characterized as an improper delegation
of power. 4 The Court suggested in a footnote, however, that a
property right might not even exist when a rezoning is sought:
The situation presented in this case is not one of a zoning
action denigrating the use or depreciating the value of
land; instead, it involves an effort to change a reasonable
zoning restriction. No existing rights are being impaired;
new use rights are being sought from the City Council.
Thus, this case involves an owner's seeking approval of a
new use free from the restrictions attached to the land
1 44
when acquired.
It might thus be argued that only zoning decisions removing or
restricting existing rights, rather than changing or increasing
rights, trigger due process interests on the part of a landowner.
ways. From one perspective the explicit provisions of the zoning ordinance create an
entitlement presently enjoyed by the landowner. Even if the landowner has not put the
land to particular uses, the State has nevertheless granted the developmental use rights to
the landowner and entitlements to use the land are therefore held by him or her. This
would also be reflected in the value of the land which would certainly suffer if the uses are
restricted. From another perspective the particular use rights derive from the common law
itself which allowed any use not constituting a nuisance, and where the initial zoning
ordinance did not go so far as to remove the rights now in question. From this perspective
the rights were not created by the zoning ordinance but instead derived from common law
and were recognized by the ordinance. See Developments in the Law-Zoning, 91 HARV. L.
REV. 1427, 1515-16 (1978).
141. 426 U.S. 668 (1976).
142. City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., 426 U.S. 668, 679 n.13 (1976).
143. Id. at 675-76. In upholding the referendum procedure, the Court characterized it
as not involving a delegation of power but instead as a reservation of power. Id. at 675.
144. Id. at 679 n.13.
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Despite this analysis, however, a state court might find a property interest to exist in several ways. First, the focus of the Roth
line of cases has been on "entitlements" created by explicit rules
or mutual understandings.14 5 A primary reason for this "entitlement" approach is to protect claims upon which people rely and
which should not be arbitrarily undermined.1 46 This suggests that
at times statutory definitions of eligibility can themselves constitute a granted entitlement for due process purposes in order to
protect a claimant's reliance interest. 1 47 This would be particularly relevant with regard to zoning, where land purchases are
often made on the reliance that zoning mechanisms are available
for seeking change. Mechanisms such as variances, special-use
permits, and rezonings provide a purchaser assurance that under
appropriate circumstances and conditions a zoning change will be
forthcoming. The statutory definitions and mutual understandings
upon which changes are based, together with the reasonable and
substantial investment-backed reliance which they invoke, should
be viewed as creating entitlements 48amounting to protected property under a due process analysis.'
A second and related reason for recognizing property interests in zoning change mechanisms is based on the common law
origins of property interests. Prior to the enactment of zoning
regulations, the common law recognized property interests in
landowners, generally allowing any use which did not constitute a
nuisance.' 49 The enactment of zoning ordinances therefore did
not create new interests as in the case of the "new property," but
instead regulated and limited preexisting property uses. Part of
this regulation and limitation were explicit provisions allowing for
use changes under appropriate circumstances so as to effectuate
the overall purposes of the ordinances and to mitigate harsh
145. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972Xproperty interests are
defined by existing rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and support claims
of entitlement to those benefits); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972Xproperty
interests exist where rules or mutually explicit understandings support claims of
entitlement to a benefit).
146. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.
147. Commentators have rejected any "present enjoyment" requirement on the
grounds that it would lead to unfair results and might encourage delay of initial benefits. 2
R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK, & J. YOUNG, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 236-37 (1986)

[hereinafter R. ROTUNDA] (the requirement of present enjoyment offers no procedural
safeguard against arbitrary action); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

690

(1988Xdenial of procedural safeguards to a new applicant is inconsistent with due process
protection).
148. See Developments in the Law-Zoning, supra note 140, at 1515-23 (identifying four
types of property entitlements deserving procedural due process protection); see also Kahn,
supra note 3, at 1018-20.
149. See generally R. ELLICKSON & D. TARLOCK, supra note 7, at 39.
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results. From this historical perspective, therefore, mechanisms
for zoning change, such as variances and rezonings, can be viewed
as important rights retained by landowners when property was
first zoned.
This analysis suggests that parties to a zoning decision might
have an entitlement in particular zoning changes based both upon
explicit statutory criteria, as in the case of variances and specialuse permits, and mutual understandings. This, of course, does not
mean that such changes must be granted whenever requested by
landowners; the underlying facts substantiating such changes must
be established. 15 0 Yet the historical origins of land interests and
the reliance-based expectations created by zoning change mechanisms both demonstrate a cognizable property interest for due
process purposes. Therefore, the affected landowner arguably has
a property interest both when the state attempts to restrict
existing uses and when the landowner himself requests zoning
changes pursuant to existing zoning procedures.
The above analysis suggests that current federal due process
law is problematic; at least with some zoning decisions, but nevertheless might provide another basis for imposition of impartiality
requirements. As noted above, however, courts have consistently
held that recognition of a zoning decision as quasi-judicial encompasses the right to some degree of impartiality; whether based on
common law, statutory interpretation,
or constitutional
grounds.' 5 1 For this reason impartiality requirements have been
consistently imposed on the variance and special-use decisions
because of their perceived quasi-judicial nature.1 52 Conversely,
courts have traditionally declined to control bias in rezonings
because of their perceived legislative nature.15 3 The next section
150. The Supreme Court has noted that the constitution does not protect only rights of
undisputed ownership but also extends to instances where the right to an entitlement is
disputed. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1978).
151. See, e.g., Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 264 Or. 574, -, 507 P.2d 23, 30
(1973Xquasi-judicial zone hearing requires impartial decisionmaker). See also Comment,
Zoning Amendments - The Product ofJudicial or Quasi-JudicialAction, 33 OHIo ST. L.J.
130, 140 (1972).
152. See, e.g., Rogoff v. Tufariello, 106 N.J. Super. 303, -, 255 A.2d 781, 784
(1969Xboard of adjustment is an independent administrative body which acts in a quasijudicial capacity and provides expert discretion and judgment); Abrahamson v. Wendell, 76
Mich. App. 278, -, 256 N.W.2d 613, 615 (1977). See generally 7 P. ROHAN, supra note 19,
at § 49.02[7] (zoning board members may be disqualified if they have a bias or a conflict of
interest).
153. See, e.g., Smith v. County Bd. of Madison County, 86 I11. App. 3d 708, __, 408
N.E.2d 452, 459 (1980Xbecause of separation of powers doctrine, courts are generally
without power to inquire into motives behind zoning ordinances); Meyers v. City of Baton
Rouge, 185 So.2d 278, 286 (La. Ct. App. 1966Xsame); Webster Assocs. v. Town of Webster,
112 Misc.2d 396, -, 447 N.Y.S.2d 401, 409 (1981Xtown supervisor who spoke in favor of
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of the article will examine the applicability of impartiality requirements to rezoning decisions.
III.

CONTROLLING BIAS AND CONFLICTS OF INTERESTS
IN REZONINGS

A major limitation on policing bias and conflicts of interest in
the zoning process has been the traditional refusal of many courts
to extend the requirement of an impartial decisionmaking to
rezoning decisions."5 4 Although a growing number of conflict of
interests statutes extend to rezoning decisions, 1 5 5 in the absence of
such statutory provisions courts have often refused to extend
either common law or due process protections to rezonings
because of their perceived legislative nature. 1 56 As a result, courts
have commonly applied the general rule that due process rights,
including the right to an impartial decisionmaker, do not attach to
15 7
legislative decisions.
This general refusal to scrutinize legislative decisions for
problems of bias and conflicts of interest reflects several related
principles. First is that due process protections generally do not
attach to legislative acts, in part because of pragmatic limitations 5 8 and in part because of the view that the legislative process
itself provides sufficient protection when large numbers of people
rezoning did not taint proceedings so as to create biased tribunal); see generally R.
ANDERSON, supra note 3, at § 4.19. But see Flemming v. City of Tacoma, 81 Wash. 2d 292,
-, 502 P.2d 327, 331-32 (1972Xfinding rezoning decision permeated with appearance of
unfairness where city councilman who voted in favor of rezoning was employed 48 hours
later by the successful applicants).
154. See, e.g., Fiser v. City of Knoxville, 584 S.W.2d 659 (Tenn. App. 1979Xrezoning
legislative act not requiring impartial decisionmaker).
155. See supra notes 84 to 87 and accompanying text.
156. See, e.g., Wait v. City of Scottsdale, 127 Ariz. 107, -, 618 P.2d 601, 602
(1980Xdecision to rezone is legislative so court may not inquire into motives of city council).
157. See, e.g., Schauer v. City of Miami Beach, 112 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 1959Xcouncilman
who would realize $600,000 gain by reason of zoning ordinance amendment not
disqualified from voting in favor of plan, because amending zoning ordinance was
legislative function); Fiser v. City of Knoxville, 584 S.W.2d 659 (Tenn. App. 1979Xcity
council members were not required to excuse themselves from consideration of a zoning
petition despite prior statements to vote against petition for personal or political reasons,
because enacting zoning ordinances is exercise of legislative police power); Blankenship v.
City of Richmond, 188 Va. 97, 49 S.E.2d 321 (1948Xcourt refused to find zoning ordinance
void because, although the city council member who procured its passage profited from
being able to erect a filling station in the zoned area, council was acting in a legislative
capacity). See also D. MANDELKER, supra note 2, at 270-71; R. ANDERSON, supra note 3, at
§ 4.19 (rule well established that the motives of individual legislators cannot be examined to
determine either the validity of a legislative act or its meaning if legislative body acted
within the scope of its authority).
158. See, e.g., Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445
(1915X"Where a rule of conduct applies to more than a few people it is impracticable that
everyone should have a direct voice in its adoption.").
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are affected.15 9 Second, courts have often alluded to separation of
power concerns in declining to police legislative bias, noting that
legislative bodies are typically concerned with policy formulation
and that the judiciary should therefore not inquire into "legislative
motives."160

Although these rationales for declining to scrutinize legislative bias might make sense in other contexts, they are misplaced
with regard to most rezonings and should be rejected for several
related reasons. First, as suggested by a significant minority of
states, small scale rezonings more closely resemble quasi-judicial
rather than legislative acts and thus should be treated as such. Second, and more fundamentally, courts should not rely upon the
quasi-judicial/ legislative distinction as a rigid label, but should
instead analyze the concerns raised in rezoning decisions from a
more functional analysis. In this regard, courts can legitimately
scrutinize problems of bias and conflicts of interest in rezoning
decisions. The next two subsections of this article will address
each of these rationales.
A.

REZONING AS QUASI-JUDICIAL

ACTS

Although a majority of jurisdictions still regard rezoning decisions as legislative, 16 a growing minority of states, 16

2

supported by

159. The concept of legislative due process has several themes. First is that since
legislative acts typically affect large numbers of people, those affected by such decisions
typically have recourse through the electoral process. Second, legislative decisionmaking
typically must go through a deliberative and protracted process, which includes logrolling,
because no faction can control proceedings and thus must compromise with others. See
Rose, supra note 7, at 853-55 (constituency of sufficient size and variety precludes a
"faction" from imposing its will at the expense of others). See also Michelman, Political
Markets and Community Self-Determination,53 IND. L.J. 145, 173-77 (1977-78Xprotracted
legislative action necessary to build majority to enact ordinance).
160. See, e.g., Louisville v. Byran S. McCoy, Inc., 286 S.W.2d 546, 549 (Ky. 1956);
County Council for Montgomery County v. District Land Corp., 274 Md. 691, -, 337 A.2d
712, 720 (1975).
161. JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 19, at 169; P. ROHAN, supra note 19, at § 50.01[2][a].
See, e.g., Wait v. Scottsdale, 127 Ariz. 107, -, 618 P.2d 601, 602 (1980Xupholding denial by
city council of zoning change from single family residential to service residential); Arnel
Dev. Co. v. City of Costa Mesa, 28 Cal. 3d 511, 620 P.2d 565, 568, 169 Cal. Rptr. 904, 907
(1980Xupholding initiative rezoning plan as valid legislative act); Rutland Envtl. Protection
Ass'n v. Kane County, 31 Ill. App. 3d 82, 87-88, 334 N.E.2d 215, 220 (1975Xchange in
zoning from farmland to community unit district to allow construction of amusement park
held valid); Crall v. City of Leominister, 362 Mass. 95, -,
284 N.E.2d 610, 614
(1972Xchange in zoning from rural residential and agricultural to industrial held valid);
O'Rourke v. City of Tulsa, 457 P.2d 782, 784 (Okla. 1969Xreinstating landowner's claim for
injunctive relief in action to enjoin enforcement of zoning regulation); Webster Assocs. v.
Town of Webster, 112 Misc. 2d 396, -_, 447 N.Y.S.2d 401, 407-08 (1981Xplan to rezone land
to permit construction of shopping mall valid).
162. States that have adopted the view that rezoning decisions are quasi-judicial, at
least for some purposes, are: Colorado (Synder v. Lakewood, 189 Colo. 421, -, 542 P.2d
371, 373, 374 (1975Xdistinguishing between enactment of a comprehensive rezoning
ordinance and amendment of zoning code)); Hawaii (Town v. Land Use Comm'n, 55 Haw.
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substantial academic commentary, 163 now view small-scale rezonings as quasi-judicial and thus subject to basic due process requirements. The leading case reflecting this trend is Fasano v.
Washington County 164 in which the Oregon Supreme Court held
that the rezoning of 32 acres of land was a quasi-judicial act which
required, among other things, provision of procedural safeguards
such as impartial decisionmakers.' 65 In reaching this conclusion,
the court emphasized the limited number of parties involved, the
small size of the affected parcel, and the pre-existing standards
established by the county's comprehensive plan. 166
The basic approach of Fasano, which focused on the specificity rather than the form of a decision, is admittedly problematic in
several respects. First is the inevitable problem of line-drawing as
to the number of the affected parties and the size of the affected
land.167 Second is its emphasis on the comprehensive plan as
establishing standards to which rezonings must conform. Not only
do most states not require the same type of plan consistency as did
538, -, 524 P.2d 84, 94 (1974Xadoption of district boundaries)); Idaho (Cooper v. Board of
County Comm'rs, 101 Idaho 407, -, 614 P.2d 947, 949, 950 (198OXdistinguishing between
zoning which regulated general policy from zoning addressing use of special property));
Kansas (Golden v. City of Overland Park, 224 Kan. 591, __, 584 P.2d 130, 135
(1978Xdistinguishing enactment of a comprehensive plan from planning for a specific tract
of land)); Kentucky (Kaelin v. City of Louisville, 643 S.W.2d 590, 592 (Ky. 1982Xtrial-type
adjudicatory hearing on a zoning change)); Maryland (Hyson v. Montgomery County
Council, 242 Md. 55, __, 217 A.2d 578, 584 (1966Xwhen council considered adjudicatory
facts it was performing quasi-judicially)); Montana (Little v. Board of County Comm'rs, 631
P.2d 1282, 1288 (Mont. 198lXselection by the county commissioners of a specific tract of
land for special zoning consideration is quasi-judicial)); Nevada (Forman v. Eagle Thrifty
Drugs and Markets, 516 P.2d 1234, 1237 (Nev. 1973Xwhen statutes require notice and
hearing zoning action becomes quasi-judicial)); Oregon (Fasano v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 264 Or. 574, -, 507 P.2d 23, 26 (1973Xdistinguishing between ordinances laying
down general policies from those which determine whether a specific use is permissible for
a specific piece of property)); Washington (Flemming v. City of Tacoma, 81 Wash. 2d 292,
_
502 P.2d 327, 331 (1972Xprocess by which zoning decisions dealing with amendment of
the code or reclassification of land are made, basically adjudicatory)).
163. See, e.g., Krasnowiecki, The Basic System of Land Use Control: Legislative
Preregulationv. AdministrativeDiscretion, in THE NEW ZONING 3 (N. Marcus & M. Groves
ed. 1970); Booth, A Realistic Reexamination of Rezoning Procedure: The Complementary
Requirements of Due ProcessandJudicialReview, 10 GA. L. REv. 753, 776 (1976Xeffects of
rezoning on individuals or small groups requires a judicial (due process) approach); Freilich,
Fasano v. Board of County Commissioners of Washington County: Is Rezoning an
Administrative or Legislative Function? 6 URB. LAW. vii, x-xi (1974Xdiscussion of the
principles and standards for judicial review of zoning amendments as established in
Fasano); Comment, Zoning Amendment - The Product of Judicial or Quasi-Judicial
Action, 33 OHIO ST. L.J. 130, 136-37 (1972Xmajority of zoning amendments should be
considered judicial or quasi-judicial action because of their effect on individuals).
164. 264 Or. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973).
165. Fasano v. Washington County, 264 Or. 574, -, 507 P.2d 23, 29-30 (1973).
166. Id. at -, 507 P.2d at 26-27.
167. See Arnel Dev. Co. v. City of Costa Mesa, 28 Cal. 3d 511, -, 620 P.2d 565, 572,
169 Cal. Rptr. 904, 911 (1 9 8OXrejecting Fasanobecause of the linedrawing difficulty); Rose,
supra note 7, at 871-73.
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the court in Fasano,18 but the ability of a comprehensive plan to
set policy standards to be subsequently applied has been seriously
questioned.

1 69

Notwithstanding these limitations, Fasano's treatment of
small-scale rezonings as quasi-judicial rather than legislative, at
least for purposes of procedural safeguards, is compelling.
Although various approaches are used to distinguish adjudicative
and legislative acts, they most frequently emphasize the number
of affected parties as a primary concern. Indeed, the classic rationale for the legislative/ adjudicative distinction is that stated by the
United States Supreme Court in Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v.
° where Justice Holmes stated:
State Board of Equalization,17

Where a rule of conduct applies to more than a few people it is impracticable that everyone should have a direct
voice in its adoption. The Constitution does not require
all public acts to be done in town meeting or assembly of
the whole. General statutes within the state power are
passed that affect the person or property of individuals,
sometimes to the point of ruin, without giving them a
chance to be heard. Their rights are protected in the only
way that they can be in a complex society, by their power,
7
immediate or remote, over those who make the rules.' 1
In this respect the particularized nature of small-scale rezonings indicates their quasi-judicial nature. Although even smallscale rezonings might raise policy concerns relevant to large numbers, their primary impact is on the landowner and surrounding
neighbors. Not only is some degree of due process relevant in
such situations, but the limited number of affected parties does in
fact limit the effective use of electoral recourse as suggested by
Justice Holmes.17
168. Although state zoning statutes require that zoning decisions be made "'in
accordance with a comprehensive plan," courts have generally interpreted this as not
requiring close conformity to the plan. See, e.g., Holmgren v. City of Lincoln, 199 Neb. 178,
__ 256 N.W.2d 686, 689 (1977Xordinance which changed zoning from a single-family
district to a multiple dwelling district did not violate legislation mandating a
comprehensive plan).
169. See, e.g., C. WEAVER & R. BABCOCK, supra note 3, at 260-69; D. MANDELKER,
supra note 14, at 63-65, 103-04; Tarlock, Consistency with Adopted Land Use Plans as a
Standardof Judicial Review: The Case Against, 9 URB. L. ANN. 69, 101 (1975).
170. 239 U.S. 441 (1915).
171. Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445
(1915Xan order to increase taxable valuation of property did not violate taxpayers due
process rights even though taxpayers were not given the opportunity to speak before the
order was made).
172. See Rather, The Function of the Due Process Clause, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1048, 1080
(1968).
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Moreover, although small-scale rezonings might involve pol-

icy decisions, they also inevitably involve site specific fact determinations. In this sense they resemble "adjudicative facts. 1 73
Whereas legislative facts are those relating to general policy, adjudicative facts relate to specific situations and people.17 4 Rezoning
decisions, although in part legitimately turning on community

biases regarding land development, also call for determinations of
175
the suitability of land uses regarding a specific parcel of land.
For these reasons a number of courts have recognized the

quasi-judicial nature of small-scale rezonings, at least for due process purposes. 1 76 Importantly, these have not necessarily been
premised on the comprehensive plan as establishing pre-existing
standards, but instead have been premised upon the view that the

particularized nature of the decision requires some form of due
process.177 Indeed, several courts have suggested that although
rezoning might be considered legislative for some purposes, it
should be considered quasi-judicial for purposes of providing an

impartial decisionmaker. 178
B.

A FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS

The willingness of some courts to consider rezonings as quasijudicial for purposes of due process reflects the notion that courts
should be free to apply a more functional approach to the rezoning issue. That is, instead of being held to a rigid quasi-judi173. See 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.08 (3d ed. 1972).
174. Id.
175. See Ford City Bank & Trust Co. v. County of Kane, 114 Ill. App. 3d 940, -, 449
N.E.2d 577, 586 (1983Xsuitabflity of private airport for an increased number of aircraft
landings); Montgomery v. Bremer County Bd. of Supervisors, 299 N.W.2d 687, 695 (Iowa
1980Xsuitability of formerly agricultural lands for industrial development); Blades v. City of
Raleigh, 280 N.C. 531, _, 187 S.E.2d 35, 41 (1972Xsuitability of five acres of land for use as
sanitarium, rest home, or for temporary sales of Christmas trees).
176. Courts that have apparently adopted the Fasano quasi-judicial approach for
purposes of procedural safeguards are: Utah (Bird v. Sorenson, 16 Utah 2d 1, 394 P.2d 808
(1964Xrezonings are administrative decisions for purposes of a referendum, but not for
judicial review)); Kansas (Golden v. City of Overland Park, 224 Kan. 591, -, 584 P.2d 130,
135 (1 9 7 8Xzoning change for a specific tract is quasi-judicial)); Maryland (Hyson v.
Montgomery County Council, 242 Md. 55, __, 217 A.2d 578, 585 (1966Xcounty council
exercised quasi-judicial function in determining facts at reclassification hearing)); Idaho
(Cooper v. Board of County Comm'rs, 101 Idaho 407, -, 614 P.2d 947, 950-51 (1980Xdenial
of rezoning by board was a quasi-judicial act)). See generally Shortlidge, The "Fasano
Doctrine".Land Use Decisions as Quasi-JudicialActs, INSTITUTE ON PLANNING, ZONING,
AND EMINENT DOMAIN, 3-1 (1985).
177. See, e.g., Cooper, 101 Idaho at -, 614 P. 2d at 949-51; Flemming v. City of
Tacoma, 81 Wash. 2d 292, -, 502 P.2d 327, 331 (1972).
178. See Olley Valley Estates, Inc. v. Fussell, 232 Ga. 779, -, 208 S.E.2d 801, 805
(1974Xdespite quasi-legislative nature of voting, zoning commissioner could be disqualified
for financial interest in outcome of vote); Netluch v. Mayor & Council, 130 N.J. Super. 104,
__ 325 A.2d 517, 520 (1974Xself-interest of a public officer in a matter in which he has a
direct voice may invalidate municipal action).
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cial/ legislative distinction, courts should assess the propriety of
applying doctrines based upon the particular characteristics
involved. Such an approach is justified by the unique nature of
both rezoning decisions and of local legislative bodies themselves.
This willingness to treat rezonings as less than fully legislative,
despite the legislative label, is in fact already reflected in various
aspects of zoning law. First is the near universal statutory requirement of notice and hearings for rezoning decisions.1 7 9 Such
requirements are not necessarily inconsistent with a legislative

label, but in fact reflect the belief that the decisionmaking process
should be structured in such a way as to gather information and
allow affected parties an opportunity to be heard.
Furthermore, state courts themselves, though espousing the

legislative label for rezonings, have often made them subject to
controls not entirely consistent with such a characterization. For

example, although legislative acts are ordinarily overturned only if
"arbitrary and capricious, "10 courts have often applied the "spot

zoning" doctrine to more closely scrutinize and control small-scale
rezonings.' 8 ' The scrutiny often applied by courts in such situations is implicitly contrary to the deference normally given legislative decisions, yet has been used to control the rezoning process.
Finally, as noted above, state courts in several instances have
taken a selective approach to applying the quasi-judicial label to
rezonings. Several states have applied it to rezonings by initiative
or referendum, but not for judicial review.18 2 Similarly, courts
have applied it for general purposes of due process rights but not
8 3
necessarily for judicial review.'
This demonstrates that despite the traditional view of rezon179. Almost all zoning enabling statutes set requirements for notice and hearings for
rezoning decisions. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 462.357 (West 1989Xno zoning
amendment shall be adopted until a public hearing has been held and notice of hearing has
been published in city's official newspaper); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-3A (West 1988Xnotice of
time and place of hearing must be published as legal advertisement at least twice before
hearing). See generally P. ROHAN, supra note 19, at § 51.03.
180. E.g., Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty, 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926).
181. See, e.g., Fritts v. City of Ashlund, 348 S.W.2d 712, 713 (Ky. 1961Xthe only proper
consideration in establishing light industry zone is whether particular area should be set
aside for that purpose); Linden Methodist Episcopal Church v. City of Linden, 113 N.J.L.
188, -, 173 A. 593, 595 (1934Xattempts to rezone single small lot should receive close
scrutiny). See generally D. MANDELKER, supra note 2, at § 6.23.
182. See Forman v. Eagle Thrifty Drugs & Markets, 89 Nev. 533, -, 516 P.2d 1234,
1237 (1973).
183. See Golden v. City of Overland Park, 224 Kan. 591, -, 584 P.2d 130, 135
(1978Xzoning change proceeding requires procedural due process protections, but standard
of judicial review is "reasonableness"); Hyson v. Montgomery County Council, 242 Md. 55,
-,
217 A.2d 578, 585 (1966Xan administrative agency addressing zoning questions required
to hold a public hearing and allow parties reasonable cross examination).
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ings as legislative decisions, courts have been willing to fashion
particularized doctrines in order to control perceived problems
with the process. Such an approach can be justified for two reasons. First is the essentially adjudicative nature of most rezoning
decisions. Whatever label is attached to the decision, its particularized nature largely involves a balancing of the rights of landowners and neighbors. As such, this raises substantial fairness
concerns distinct from traditional legislative decisions, thus neces184
sitating a more deliberative process.
A second reason for more closely scrutinizing rezoning decisions concerns the nature of local legislative bodies themselves.
The normal deference to legislative decisionmaking processes is
premised on a model of government in which undue influence in
decisionmaking is mitigated by the inability of any one interest
group to dominate.' 5 This model, based on national and state legislatures, envisions logrolling and coalition building as a necessary
part of the legislative process.186 Further, this necessarily involves
a protracted process resulting in the forced deliberation of issues;
benefits insured in other contexts by trial-like procedures. 7
These features of legislative action are often viewed as a type of
"legislative due process."
Commentators have frequently noted that local governing
bodies often lack these features. 18 They are frequently smaller in
size and of a more homogeneous character and thus are not forced
to pursue the more compromising and deliberative process indicative of "higher" legislative bodies.' 9 This makes them more susceptible to the undue influence of personal conflicts since the
process itself is less likely to insulate against the taint of bias upon
the ultimate decision.
This distinct nature of local government itself reinforces the
need for policing conflicts of interest in zoning decisions. The
184. See Udell v. Haas, 21 N.Y.2d 463, -, 235 N.E.2d 897, 902, 288 N.Y.S.2d 888, 893
(1 9 6 8Xurging a calm and deliberate consideration of zoning alternatives); R. BABCOCK,
BILLBOARDS, GLASS HOUSES AND LAW 74-78 (1977Xnoting criticism of grant or denial of
zoning changes as often devoid of fairness and forethought).
185. See Rose, supra note 7, at 854-55(the clash of multiple interests prevents hasty
legislative decisions); cf. Michelman, supra note 159, at 148 (there are no public interests,
but only a chain of particular interests).
186. See Michelman, supra note 159, at 173 (coalition and logrolling theory explain
how majoritarian governments can serve individual interests).
187. See H. PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 195-96 (1967Xdiscussing
liberalism's view that time will allow the "voice of reason to prevail over immediate selfish
gain").
188. See Rose, supra note 7, at 855-57 (discussing problem of lack of multiple interests
in small governing bodies).
189. Id. at 855-56.
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potential lack of a deliberative, compromising process makes ultimate decisions more vulnerable to individual prejudices. Further,
local governmental processes arguably lack the legitimacy
bestowed by more deliberative processes, a concern exacerbated
by legislators acting out of self-interest. This is particularly true
with regard to current zoning practices, which, because of their
often apparent ad hoc nature, lack a sense of legitimacy.
The above analysis suggests several reasons why courts have
and should fashion particularized solutions to perceived problems
with small-scale rezonings. This is particularly justified with
regard to problems of conflicts of interest on the part of local legislators. Not only is the policing of such interests administratively
feasible,1 90 but the problems posed by self-interested decisions are
especially significant to rezonings because of the lack of electoral
recourse and the frequent perception of "dealmaking."
Treating small-scale rezonings as quasi-judicial and thus subject to review for bias and conflicts of interests does not mean that
courts should ignore the concurrent political nature of such decisions. Local legislators are politically elected officials who must
serve a variety of functions. An elected official who advocates particular views on community development and land use in his policymaking role need not abandon them when deciding a
particularized rezoning.' 9 1 At the same time, however, certain
biases, most notably those flowing from personal and unique interests, have nothing to do with representative decisionmaking and
threaten accuracy and legitimacy concerns. Courts should therefore shape the contours of regulation to permit the legitimate representative function of local legislators but control biases which do
not serve that function.
The next section of this article will examine the scope of regulation, looking first at general guidelines and then at several categories of more specific problems.
190. As will be discussed in section IV, the serious regulation of bias and conflicts of
interest will impose some cost on the zoning process by elimination of some otherwise
qualified decisionmakers.
Assuming sensitivity to the need for representative
decisionmaking, the prohibition of particular biases is realistic. This can be contrasted to
instances of legislation applicable to a large number of people, in which providing an
opportunity to be heard is impracticable. See Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Bd. of
Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915Xwhere rule of conduct applies to'many people, it is
impractical for everyone to have a voice in its adoption).
191. City of Fairfield v. Superior Court, 14 Cal. 3d 768, __, 537 P.2d 375, 382-83, 122
Cal. Rptr. 543, 550-51 (1975Xcouncilmen's role as legislator, administrator and quasi-judicial
officer allows information from outside sources to enter into decisionmaking process); 1000
Friends of Oregon v. Wasco County Court, 304 Or. 76, -, 742 P.2d 39, 43 (1987Xelected
board member need not avoid appearance of interest when switching from policymaking
role to adjudicatory role).
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EXAMINING THE SCOPE OF REGULATION
A.

GENERAL GUIDELINES

Despite the important interests served by controlling bias and
conflicts of interest in zoning decisions, it is inevitable that some
bias and conflicts of interest will exist and therefore they must be
tolerated to some extent. Everyone brings from his background
beliefs and attitudes which influence decisions, 9 2 and in localized
decisionmaking like zoning it is likely that decisionmakers themselves will to some extent be affected by zoning decisions. To
attempt to remove all problems of bias is neither prudent nor realistic. Moreover, attempts at regulating bias and conflicts of interest might at times conflict with other values, such as the need for
representative decisionmaking, stability in government, and sensitivity to the community consensus regarding land policy.
For these reasons, courts must engage in some linedrawing
when regulating problems of bias and conflicts of interest. Any
attempt at regulation should, of course, seek to further the accuracy and legitimacy interests supporting the impartiality requirement. Thus, the tolerability of particular conflicts should in part
turn on the degree to which they pose a threat to zoning legitimacy and accuracy. In particular, this should mean policing bias
so as to guard against the likelihood a conflict will improperly influence a decision and to further insure that decisions appear to be
fair and proper.
At the same time, however, courts should recognize two limitations on regulation. First is recognition of the pragmatic limits
to regulation. Martin Redish has suggested that the degree of bias
we should be willing to tolerate in adjudicatory settings should be
limited by our ability to avoid it.' 9 3 This is particularly significant
with regard to zoning where decisions frequently impact to some
degree on large numbers of people.
Moreover, overly stringent regulation potentially restricts the
pool of qualified decisionmakers and destabilizes the zoning process. This is especially true in smaller communities where the possibility of family, business, and financial associations is much
192. See, e.g., Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824,835 (1972Xjudge's lack of opinion in area of
constitutional adjudication indicates lack of qualification, not lack of bias); Redish &
Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of ProceduralDue Process, 95 YALE
L.J. 455, 501-03 (1986Xdiscussing the presence of personal bias and prior exposure to facts
or law in adjudicatory process).
193. Redish & Marshall, supra note 192, at 492 (slight potential bias should be removed
if it is not extremely burdensome to do so).
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greater.19 4 Indeed, some state conflict of interest statutes specifically recognize that the public interest will suffer by enacting too
stringent of standards which would deprive government of qualified decisionmakers1 9 5 Thus, the need to ensure accurate decisions and legitimate processes must to some extent be tempered
by pragmatic limits on regulation and recognition of the costs
attendant to regulation.
The second important limitation on regulation is recognition
of the political dimensions of zoning practice. Although this article has argued that the political dimensions of zoning should not
act as a barrier to regulation, at the same time they should be recognized in regulating biases. This is important not only for pragmatic reasons, but because the legitimacy of the zoning system
itself requires that zoning decisionmaking be responsive to community concerns and ideals. This responsiveness manifests itself
most clearly with regard to rezoning decisions where the elected
status of decisionmakers places them
in a representative capacity
1 96
which is relevant to their decisions.
Courts have articulated a variety of approaches in addressing
problems of bias and conflicts of interest in zoning and have sought
to balance the above concerns. These have varied not only
according to particular jurisdictions, but also with regard to the
particular problem addressed. Generally speaking, however,
courts have articulated three general tests or standards in regulating bias in zoning decisionmaking.
First, some courts have stated that a clear showing of actual, as
opposed to apparent, bias is required before a decision will be
invalidated. This approach distinguishes between instances where
a decision will clearly benefit a decisionmaker and those in which
only a potential for benefit exists. For example, in 1000 Friendsof
Oregon v. Wasco County Court1 9 7 the Oregon Supreme Court
194. See R. ELLICKSON & D. TARLOCK, supra note 7, at 291-92.
195. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 112.311 (West 1982Xit is essential that government attract
the people best qualified to serve); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 1011 (1979X"the public
interest will suffer if unduly stringent requirements deprive government 'of the services of
all but princes and paupers.' "); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:13D-12(cX 1986Xbecause public officials
should have certain interests in government decisions, their conduct should not be unduly
circumscribed).
196. See City of Fairchild v. Superior Court, 14 Cal. 3d 768, __,537 P.2d 375, 382-83,
122 Cal. Rptr. 543, 550-51 (1975Xcandidate's campaign statements do not disqualify him
from voting on the matter when it comes before him after his election); 1000 Friends of
Oregon v. Wasco County Court, 304 Or. 76, -, 742 P.2d 39, 43 (1987Xunpaid, popularly
elected boards do not sufficiently resemble courts so as to warrant imposing disqualification
rules upon them); TARLOCK, supra note 36, at 86 (members of zoning boards are often
elected because of their opinion).
197. 304 Or. 76, 742 P.2d 39 (1987).
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held that a past business relationship between a county commissioner and proponents of a land use change did not invalidate the
decision since there was not a clear showing of bias. 198 This
approach therefore is concerned primarily with substantive results
as opposed to mere appearances.1 99
A second standard frequently articulated by courts is the
"potential temptation to the average man" standard.2 0 0 This test
has often been used to distinguish between direct and substantial
interests, which are subject to regulation, and remote interests
which are not. 20 ' The focus of this analysis, therefore, is on the
strength of particular interests and the likelihood that they may
affect the ultimate outcome of a decision. This has been applied
not only to instances where a decisionmaker is associated in some
manner with an interested party, but in any situation where there
20 2
is a potential conflict.
Finally, a third standard used by courts is an "appearance of
fairness" test. In some instances courts have emphasized concerns
about public perceptions of fairness and confidence in zoning in
combination with other standards, such as the "possible temptation" test.20 3 In this sense the threat to confidence in zoning is
viewed as more or less coterminous with the likelihood that a particular interest will affect a decision and operates as an additional
rationale for regulating bias.
198. 1000 Friends of Oregon v. Wasco County Court, 304 Or. 76, -, 742 P.2d 39, 46
(1987).
199. Id. at -, 742 P.2d at 46 (rejecting the "appearance of fairness" standard).
200. See, e.g., Dana Robin Corp. v. Common Council, of City of Danbury, 166 Conn.
207, __, 348 A.2d 560, 563 (1978Xofficial forbidden to place self in position of conflict
between public and private duties); Van Itallie v. Borough of Franklin Lakes, 28 N.J. 258,
__ 146 A.2d 111, 116 (1958Xquestion is whether situation has capacity to tempt the official
to depart from sworn duty); S&L Assoc. Inc. v. Washington TWD, 61 N.J. Super. 312, -,
160 A.2d 635,644 (1960Xofficial should not be placed in situation which tempts him to serve
his own purposes); Zagoreos v. Conklin, 109 A.D.2d 281, __, 491 N.Y.S.2d 358, 362-63
(1985Xpolicy of the law is to keep the official away from temptation to insure his devotion to
the public interest).
201. See, e.g., S&L Associates, Inc., 61 N.J. Super. at -, 160 A.2d at 644 (remote
interest does not warrant disqualification).
202. See, e.g., Zagoreos, 109 A.D.2d at __, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 362-63 (test is not whether
there is a conflict, but whether there might be).
203. See, e.g., Dana-Robbin Corp., 166 Conn. at -, 348 A.2d at 563-64 (member of
planning commission who owned stock in family corporation which owned property which
might be affected by vote had an interest in outcome which was too speculative to require
disqualification); Low v. Town of Madison, 135 Conn. 1, -, 60 A.2d 774, 778 (1948Xmember
of zoning commission could not vote on wife's application for zoning change); Fail v. La
Porte County Board, 171 Ind. App. 192, -, 355 N.E.2d 455, 458 (1976Xcourt may find a
conflict of interest if the situation is reasonably calculated to weaken public confidence in
the zoning authority); Tuxedo Conservation & Taxpayers Ass'n v. Town Board, 96 Misc. 2d
1, __, 408 N.Y.S.2d 668, 672 (1978Xwhere there was a possible appearance of impropriety,
councilman should have disqualified himself); Barbara Realty Co. v. Zoning Bd., 85 R.I. 152,
__ 128 A.2d 342, 344 (1957Xmember of zoning board should not say or do anything which
would raise an inference of bias).
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At times, however, the "appearance of fairness" test has been
a separate standard suggesting a higher degree of scrutiny of
potential biases and conflicting interests. This is most clearly seen
in Washington case law where courts have applied an "appearance
of fairness" standard quite stringently.2 " 4 The Washington courts
have used this standard not only to strike down direct personal
interests, 20 5 but also to invalidate decisions involving more tenuous associational relationships and instances of prejudgment. For
example, in Chrobuck v. Snohomish County20 the Washington
Supreme Court struck down a rezoning in part because of ex parte
lobbying contacts the petitioner had with a commissioner, which
included a business trip to Los Angeles paid for by the petitioner.20 7 In addition, the court also stressed that prior to being
assigned to the commission, another commissioner had represented the petitioner in legal matters. 20 8 From these circumstances, as well as others not pertinent to this discussion, the court
stated that the cumulative effect created an impermissible appearance of unfairness.20 9 Therefore, the rezoning was invalidated. °
As applied in this manner, the "appearance of fairness" test
places a substantial emphasis on maintaining confidence in the
zoning system. Such an approach is justified for two reasons. First,
since actual bias is difficult to discern, an emphasis on appearance
helps to ensure accuracy concerns. Second, and more importantly, the current nature of zoning decisionmaking creates important interests on the part of both landowners and neighbors that
necessitate a fair deliberation of zoning decisions. Thus, it would
204. See Buell v. Bremerton, 80 Wash. 2d 518, -,
495 P.2d 1358, 1361-62
(1972Xappearance of fairness doctrine requires only a showing of interest which might
influence a member, not a showing that the interest actually did); Flemming v. City of
Tacoma, 81 Wash. 2d 292, -, 502 P.2d 327, 331 (1972Xnot only must hearings appear fair,
but the motives of the person's conducting the hearings must be above reproach);
Chrobuck v. Snohomish County, 78 Wash. 2d 858, -, 480 P.2d 489, 496 (1971Xpublic
officers have duty to be fair, open-minded, objective, and impartial to avoid appearance of
unfairness); Smith v. Skagit County, 75 Wash. 2d 715, -, 453 P.2d 832, 842 (1969Xpublic
hearings must be both fairly undertaken and appear to be done with the purpose to
ascertain the wiser legislative course). See generally Phillips, The Appearance of Fairness
Doctrine,20 URB. L. ANN. 75 (1980). See also Gailey & Strom, Conflicts of Interest on the
Partof Zoning Decisionmakers,in 1983 ZONING & PLANNING LAW HANDBOOK 97, 110-16
(1983).
205. See Buell v. Bremerton, 80 Wash. 2d 518, __, 495 P.2d 1358, 1362
(1972Xcommission member experiencing conflict should publicly declare interest and
abstain from voting).
206. 78 Wash. 2d 858, 480 P.2d 489 (1971).
207. Chrobuck v. Snohomish County, 78 Wash. 2d 858, -, 480 P.2d 489, 494, 496
(1971).
208. Id. at -, 480 P.2d at 496.
209. Id. at

-,

480 P.2d at 496.

210. Id. at

-,

480 P.2d at 495-96.
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seem that an approach which is concerned with public perceptions of this process is particularly appropriate today.
At the same time, however, an emphasis on "appearance of
fairness" needs to recognize the distinct nature of zoning decisionmaking. As noted above, the regulation of bias and conflicting
interests potentially imposes costs on a community in terms of
available qualified decisionmakers. Further, "fairness" needs to be
interpreted in terms of the nature of the decisions, which are
quasi-judicial rather than fully judicial. Legitimate zoning decisions mean not only deliberative decisionmaking, but also ones
which are representational at times. For these reasons an "appearance of fairness" standard should not be read as prohibiting natural contacts between decisionmakers and interested parties nor
the natural policy biases brought to the process, which overreaction might occur if the Washington approach is taken to an
extreme.
The need to ensure accurate and legitimate zoning decisions
must therefore be balanced with the pragmatic limits to regulation
and sensitivity to policy concerns. In many instances such a delicate balancing must ultimately turn on the unique facts of each
case. The particular nature of the interest or bias, however, is also
important in analyzing the scope of regulation. The next section
will therefore more closely examine five common problem areas of
potential bias often encountered in zoning decisions: financial
interests, associational interests, prejudgment and bias, ex parte
contacts, and receipt of campaign contributions.
B.

SPECIFIC PROBLEMS OF BIAS AND CONFLICTS OF
INTEREST

1. FinancialConflicts
Probably the clearest and most frequent type of impermissible conflicting interests are financial conflicts. The common law's
prohibitions were most frequently directed against financial interests, 2 1 as are many of the conflict of interest statutes in force
today. 2 12 Similarly, constitutional due process analysis in invalidat211. E.g., Atherton v. Concord, 109 N.H. 164, __, 245 A.2d 387, 388 (1968Xconflict
exists if administrative official votes on matter in which he has direct personal or pecuniary
interests).
212. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-222 (1977Xa supervisor shall not vote on a
measure in which his family or his partner is pecuniarily interested); IDAHO CODE § 676506 (1980Xmember or employee of zoning board or commission shall not participate when
he, his employer, partner, associate or specified relative has an economic interest in the
action).
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ing a decision has often focused on and emphasized the pecuniary
nature of the alleged personal interest.21 3
For these reasons courts have generally been sensitive to
financial conflicts in zoning decisions and have declared them
invalid in a number of situations. This has been based not only on
specific pecuniary prohibitions, but also on more general statutory
prohibitions and on constitutional grounds. On this basis courts
have struck down land use decisions where a participating deci-

sionmaker might financially benefit as a neighboring landowner, 2 14 an employee 21 5 or business associate of an affected
landowner,2 1 6 or would otherwise financially benefit.21 7
Societal intolerance for financial conflicts is easy to understand. They clearly interfere with the ability to make accurate
decisions by preventing an objective assessment of data. Similarly,
the legitimacy of zoning decisions is threatened by financial conflicts which tend to suggest the ultimate crassness and corruption.
Decisionmaking for personal gain gives the appearance of votes
being bought and sold which strongly undermines the legitimacy
of any system. Moreover, because financial interests are for the
most part unique to individuals, such interests should be feasible to
police.
Despite the consistent recognition that financial conflicts of
interest violate impartiality standards, courts have frequently
stated that difficult questions arise regarding the degree of interest
213. See, e.g., Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Lavoie, 54 U.S. 813, 821-22 (1986Xviolation
of fourteenth amendment to subject person to judgment of court when judge has a
pecuniary interest in outcome); Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60
(1972Xdenial of due process where mayor who was responsible for village's finances
presided at trial and assessed traffic fines); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927Xdenial of
due process when judge is paid for service only when he convicts defendants).
214. See Buell v. City of Bremerton, 80 Wash. 2d 518, __, 495 P.2d 1358, 1362-63
(1972Xself-interest of one commissioner invalidated zoning whether or not his vote was
necessary to enact zoning).
215. See Smith v. City of Shelbyville, 462 N.E.2d 1052, 1053, 1057 (Ind. Ct. App.
1984Xon remand trial court shall hear issue of conflict of interest on part of councilmen with
ties to parties seeking a vacation of an alley); Aldom v. Borough of Roseland, 42 N.J. Super.
495, -, 127 A.2d 190, 196-97 (1956Xparticipation by a councilman who is also an employee
of an interested party voids the zoning decision); Zagoreos v. Conklin, 109 A.D.2d 281, -,
491 N.Y.S.2d 358, 362 (1985Xperceived conflict of interest where decisive votes were cast
by board members who were employees of an interested party).
216. See Tuxedo Conservation & Taxpayers Ass'n v. Town Bd., 96 Misc. 2d 1, -, 408
N.Y.S.2d 668, 673 (1978), aff'd, 418 N.Y.S.2d 638, 639-40 (1978Xboard member should have
disqualified self where business connections with applicant caused appearance of unfair
hearing); Kloter v. Zoning Commission, 26 Conn. Supp. 495, __, 227 A.2d 563, 566-67
(1967Xmember of zoning commission for whom applicant was accountant and advisor
should have disqualified self).
217. See Piggott v. Borough of Hopewell, 22 N.J. Super. 106, -, 91 A.2d 667, 669
(1952Xcouncil person sold property to variance applicant); Daly v. Town Plan & Zoning
Comm'n, 150 Conn. 495, -, 191 A.2d 250, 251 (1963Xmember of zoning commission was
the president of the association which sold land to the applicant for a zoning variance).
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necessary to constitute a violation of due process. In the constitutional arena, the Supreme Court has stressed that while "a direct,
personal, substantial, pecuniary interest" is subject to regulation,
speculative and remote interests are not.2 18 State zoning decisions
have similarly distinguished between substantial interests which
are subject to regulation and remote interests which are not.2 19
Although striking the balance in this way is justified, it is
important to recognize the variety of situations in which a zoning
decisionmaker might be tempted by financial gain. The most
obvious situation arises where the decisionmaker's own property is
the subject of a zoning change. Depending on the nature of the
change, the decisionmaker as landowner potentially will be financially benefitted or harmed, either of which involves a clear pecuniary interest. Similarly, financial interests will often arise because
of a decisionmaker's status as a neighbor of affected land.2 2 °
Substantial pecuniary interests might arise in several other
contexts in addition to affected land values. Most significant in this
regard are instances where the decisionmaker is in an employment or business relationship with a zoning applicant. 2 1
Although the decisionmaker might not realize an immediate financial benefit, there might be substantial pressure to decide a particular way to ensure the relationship continues with its attendant
financial rewards. Moreover, the substantial legitimacy concerns
raised in such circumstances also justify regulation. For these reasons courts have properly invalidated decisions where a clear business relationship existed or where the decisionmaker was
employed by an interested party.2 2 2
Although courts have thus primarily focused on the substantiality of pecuniary interests when assessing impartiality, a second
218. Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 821-22 (1986); Ward v. Village of
Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60 (1972); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927).
219. See, e.g., Moody v. University Park, 278 S.W.2d 912, 919 (Tex. Ct. App. 1955Xfact
that one member of board of adjustment was third or fourth cousin of president of applicant
did not constitute substantial interest); Copple v. City of Lincoln, 205 Neb. 152, -, 274
N.W.2d 520, 528 (1979Xcouncilman's interest as partner in partnership owning land
approved for rezoning was not an immediate and direct pecuniary interest).
220. See, e.g., Schauer v. Miami Beach, 112 So. 2d 838, 841 (Fla. 1959Xcouncilman
would realize $600,000 gain by rezoning of neighboring land); Buell v. City of Bremerton,
80 Wash. 2d 518, -, 495 P.2d 1358, 1362 (1972Xchairman of planning commission had
conflict of interest in zoning ordinance because his property appreciated as a result of the
ordinance).
221. See Aldom v. Borough of Roseland, 42 N.J. Super. 495, -, 127 A.2d 190, 196-97
(1956Xcouncilman was employee of interested party); Zagoreos v. Conklin, 109 A.D.2d 281,
__ 491 N.Y.S.2d 358, 362 (1985Xboard member was employee of interested party).
222. See Aldom, 42 N.J. Super. at -, 127 A.2d at 196-97 (councilman was employee of
interested party); Zagoreos, 109 A.D.2d at __, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 362 (board member was
employee of interested party).
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factor upon which regulation should turn is how unique or com-

mon the interest is. This is relevant for two reasons. First are
pragmatism concerns. The more widely held a particular interest,
the more difficult and costly it is to remove. Second, the more
widely held an interest, the more it is arguably representative of
community interests and thus relevant to the decisions.
For these reasons, therefore, even substantial interests are tolerable where they might be viewed as incidental to a person's status as a community member rather than viewed as a unique
interest. This is perhaps most relevant to interests which result
from ownership of neighboring land. Where the decisionmaker
lives in close proximity to the land in question, the interest is probably unique enough to justify regulation, even if it is shared with
similarly situated neighbors. Conversely, where the interest is one
that will affect a large number of people to the same degree as it
affects the decisionmaker, the conflicting interest should be more
tolerable. Regulation is more difficult in such situations, where the
interest arguably represents a community rather than a personal
interest and thus is properly incorporated into decisionmaking.
2. Associational Conflicts
A second source of conflicts of interest in zoning decisionmaking are associations or relationships that a decisionmaker might
have with parties involved in or affected by a zoning decision. The
types of associations that might create conflicts are obviously quite
diverse, but most commonly involve familial, 23 business,224 or
community relationships.225 Common to these various relationships, however, is the concern that a decisionmaker's relationship
with an interested party will improperly affect the ultimate decision, thus calling into question the accuracy of decisions and
undermining the legitimacy of the system.
223. See, e.g., Thorne v. Zoning Commission, 178 Conn. 198, 423 A.2d 861
(1979Xparents and sister of commissioner owned adjacent. property); Low v. Town of
Madison, 135 Conn. 1, 60 A.2d 774 (1948Xspouse's application for rezoning); Kremer v. City
of Plainfield, 101 N.J. Super. 346, 244 A.2d 335 (1968Xmember's nephew was senior partner
of law firm representing applicant); Moody v. University Park, 278 S.W.2d 912 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1955Xboard member was third or fourth cousin of president of applicant corporation).
224. See, e.g., Kloter v. Zoning Commission, 26 Conn. Supp. 495, 227 A.2d 563
(1967Xaccountant and business advisor to landowner); Zagoreos v. Conklin, 109 A.D.2d 281,
491 N.Y.S.2d 358 (1985Xemployee).
225. See, e.g., Zell v. Roseland, 42 N.J. Super. 75, 125 A.2d 890 (1956Xchurch
membership); Cobble Close Farm v. Board of Adjustment, 10 N.J. 422, 92 A.2d 4
(1952Xhomeowner's association); Save a Valuable Environment (SAVE) v. City of Bothell, 89
Wash. 2d 862, 576 P.2d 401 (1978Xchamber of commerce ties). See also, Gailey & Strom,
Conflicts of Interest on the Part of Zoning Decisionmakers, in 1983 ZONING & PLANNING
LAW HANDBOOK 97, 103-05 (1983).
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Although language in opinions has occasionally suggested that
concerns about bias and conflicts of interest should be limited to
pecuniary conflicts, 2 2 6 it seems clear that regulation should extend
to nonpecuniary interests under either common law or constitu-

tional standards. Not only have courts readily regulated nonpecuniary conflicts which clearly posed a threat to decisions,2 27 but the
various tests used to address problems of bias and conflict of interest all strongly indicate that regulation should extend to nonpecuniary interests. 2 28 There is little doubt that a close association or
relationship with an interested party will often have a greater
impact on a decision than many pecuniary interests. Relationships
and associations thereby pose a threat to accuracy interests.2 2 9
Similarly, participation in a decision involving a close association

will be perceived as tainted and thus lacking the "appearance of
fairness" which is essential to a proper decisionmaking process.
Any attempt at assessing the propriety of associational conflicts should take into account both the nature of the relationship
or association itself and the nature of the underlying interest. In
this regard a greater concern for regulation generally exists when
the decisionmaker's association is with an affected landowner
rather than with affected neighbors. Not only will the underlying
benefit or harm usually be less with neighbors than landowners,
but pragmatic limitations exist because of the increased likelihood
of associations with neighbors of land. For this reason the same
type of association should often be more acceptable when it is with
a neighbor as opposed to when it is with a landowner.
226. See, e.g., Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986).
227. See Kimura v. Roberts, 89 Cal. App. 3d 871, -, 152 Cal. Rptr. 569, 571-72
(1979Xmember of planning commission removed after her husband was elected to city
council); Kremer v. City of Plainfield, 101 N.J. Super. 346, __, 244 A.2d 335, 337-39
(1968Xplanning commissioner disqualified because nephew was partner in law firm
representing applicant); Save a Valuable Environment (SAVE) v. City of Bothell, 89 Wash.
2d 862, -, 576 P.2d 401, 407-08 (1978Xzoning commissioners had ties with chamber of
commerce); Fleck v. King County, 16 Wash. App. 668, -, 558 P.2d 254, 257-58
(1977Xmarried couple serving on board of appeals). But see Schweihofer v. Zachary, 303
N.W.2d 896, 899 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981Xuncle of applicant not disqualified from voting);
Center Square Ass'n, Inc. v. Corning, 105 Misc. 2d 6, __, 430 N.Y.S.2d 953, 958
(1980Xmembership by review board chairman in nonprofit corporate applicant did not
constitute conflict of interest).
228. See Wyman v. Popham, 252 Ga. 247, __, 312 S.E.2d 795, 797 (1984Xfraud or
corruption); Mutton Hill Estates, Inc. v. Town of Oakland, 468 A.2d 989, 992 (Me. 1983Xex
parte contact); Winslow v. Town of Holderness Planning Bd., 125 N.H. 262, -, 480 A.2d
114, 117 (1984Xprejudgment of case); McVay v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 91 Pa. Commw. 167,
98
__ 496 A.2d 1328, 1330 (1
5Xactual bias or appearance of unfairness).
229. As Professor Redish has noted in a different context: "A judge is likely to be more
concerned with giving his brother-in-law a break than with securing $5.00 for a traffic
conviction. Similarly, the temptation to get revenge against a party that the judge dislikes
may be as alluring as pecuniary gain." Redish & Marshall, supra note 192, at 501.
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This does not mean that any association with neighbors is permissible. Certainly a close relationship with a neighbor who has a
substantial interest in a decision should be closely examined. For
example, in Thorne v. Zoning Commission 230 the chairman of the
zoning commission voted in favor of rezoning the plaintiff's land
from business to residential when the chairman's parents and sister owned adjacent land which was also zoned residential.2 3 ' The
court correctly found an impermissible conflict of interest since
the chairman's close relationship with the neighboring parties substantially affected or would likely affect his vote.232
The second factor is the nature of the association or relationship itself. Close family relationships clearly raise the most concern and should usually lead to disqualification. In this regard
courts have invalidated decisions where a decisionmaker's spouse
is an affected landowner 233 and where a planning commissioner's
nephew was a partner in the firm representing an applicant for a
zoning change.234 Moreover, courts have invalidated participation
on zoning boards either because another family member served
236
on the same board 235 or on a board having review authority.
At the same time courts have been willing to permit some
familial associations, usually of a more attenuated nature. These
have included situations where a decisionmaker was a third or
fourth cousin of an applicant 237 and where the chairman of the
zoning board was the uncle, by marriage, of the attorneys of the
applicant for a variance.238 In several instances, however, courts
have arguably tolerated familial associations which would raise
substantial legitimacy concerns. For example, in Van Itallie v.

FranklinLakes 23 9 the New Jersey Supreme Court allowed partici-

pation by a councilrhan even though his father had a property
interest that would be benefitted by the decision.24 °
Potential associational conflicts posed by community relationships are in many ways more difficult to assess. Although even
informal associations can potentially affect a decision, pragmatic
limits to regulation exist, particularly in smaller communities
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

178 Conn. 198, 423 A.2d 861 (1979).
Thorne v. Zoning Comm'n, 178 Conn. 198, __, 423 A.2d 861, 863 (1979).
id. at -, 423 A.2d at 864-65.
Low v. Madison, 135 Conn. 1, __, 60 A.2d 774, 778 (1948).
Kremer v. City of Plainsfield, 101 N.J. Super. 346, -, 244 A.2d 335, 339 (1968).
Fleck v. King County, 16 Wash. App. 668, -, 558 P.2d 254, 258 (1977).
Kimura v. Roberts, 89 Cal. App. 3d 871, 152 Cal. Rptr. 569 (1979).
Moody v. University Park, 278 S.W.2d 912, 918-19 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955).
Barbara Realty Co. v. Zoning Board, 85 R.I. 512, -, 128 A.2d 342, 344 (1957).
28 N.J. 258, 146 A.2d 111 (1958).
Van Itallie v. Franklin Lakes, 28 N.J. 258, -, 146 A.2d 111, 116 (1958).
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where the potential for some relationship is significant. Further,
to some extent zoning decisionmakers should be encouraged to
have a good understanding of their community and be actively
involved in civic and community affairs. To scrutinize closely all
associations is therefore neither realistic nor desirable in that
boards and legislative bodies will hopefully consist of people
actively involved with and knowledgeable of their communities.
For these reasons courts should invalidate decisions only
where a strong and unique relationship exists between the decisionmaker and applicant. One clear instance of this would be
where a decisionmaker is a member of a community group or
organization, such as a church,2 4 1 which is the applicant for a zoning change. In such instances the organization's interest can be
fairly implied to the decisionmaker.
3.

Bias and Prejudgment

As discussed in the introduction to this section, a general distinction should be made in regulating zoning impartiality between
bias based on opinion and bias based on self-interest. Although
bias based on opinion will often affect zoning decisions, it is necessarily tolerated for two reasons. First, some opinion is inevitable,
especially where decisionmakers are drawn from a local area. Second, opinions regarding land development, as opposed to personal
interest, play an important role in zoning decisions by reflecting
community values regarding land development.
This need to respect opinion is most apparent with regard to
rezonings where bias regarding land development can be viewed
as an appropriate function of the political process. Such bias is
often reflected in campaign statements where an official might
campaign for office on a pro- or anti-development stance. 4 2 In
such situations, the bias should be viewed as reflecting public as
well as personal preference regarding land allocation. Thus, a city
councilperson's campaigning against construction of more apartments should not disqualify this person from later voting on a spe241. See Zell v. Borough of Roseland, 42 N.J. Super. 75, __, 125 A.2d 890, 893-94
(1956Xmember of planning board approving zoning change was also member of church
which benefited from the rezoning).
242. See, e.g., Wollen v. Borough of Ft. Lee, 27 N.J. 408, -, 142 A.2d 881, 890
(1956Xamendment of zoning ordinance was not void where officials had publicly
announced before election that they would vote in favor of this type of rezoning); City of
Farmers Branch v. Hawnco, Inc., 435 S.W.2d 288, 292 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968Xcampaign
statements opposing apartment construction did not disqualify the officials from
participating in action on apartment zoning change).
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cific proposal to rezone from apartment to residential.2 4 3
This analysis is also relevant, though to a lesser extent, to the
traditional administrative variance and special-use decisions.
Decisionmakers will inevitably have some bias regarding land
development which will likely affect a decision. Moreover, opinion on land use serves to reflect community values and preferences regarding land development. For these reasons the
inevitable predispositions that members of lay boards might have
to particular decisions generally should be tolerated.2 4 4
When predisposition on an issue becomes prejudgment, however, the right to an impartial decisionmaker is arguably violated. 24 5 This would usually occur where a member of the board
has indicated a strong bias regarding a particular decision prior to
or outside the normal decisionmaking process. Since variance and
special-use decisions are made pursuant to established criteria,
interested parties have a right to a decision on that basis. Prejudgment in such an instance therefore interferes with both accuracy
and legitimacy concerns.
Determining what type of statements would establish such
predisposition must turn on specific facts; not every statement
should suffice but only those demonstrating a strong prejudgment.
For example, a decisionmaker's suggesting predisposition toward
or against particular uses should not invalidate a decision. On the
other hand, clear statements suggesting that a decision has already
been reached, or prejudged, should suffice to invalidate a
decision.2 4 6
4.

Ex Parte Contacts

Ex parte communications between zoning decisionmakers
and private parties present a particularly difficult issue for
courts.2 4 7 Such contacts arguably distort substantive decisions by
243. Hawnco, Inc., 435 S.W.2d at 292.
244. Furtney v. Simsbury Zoning Comm'n, 159 Conn. 585, -, 271 A.2d 319, 323
(1970Xzoning commissioners not prohibited from having opinions about community
development); General Cinema Corp. v. Foley, 60 A.D.2d 856, __,401 N.Y.S.2d 249, 250
(1978Xdecisionmaker not disqualified even though he had previously expressed bias against
the type of use in question).
245. Furtney, 159 Conn. at __, 271 A.2d at 323 (decisive issue is whether
decisionmaker had already made up mind before hearing).
246. See Barbara Realty Co. v. Zoning Board, 85 R.I. 152, -, 128 A.2d 342, 343
(1957Xmember of a zoning board was disqualified when he told opponents of the variance
before the hearing that "'we are going to shove it down your throat").
247. For commentary on ex parte contacts and zoning, see Tarlock, Detecting and
Challenging Bias in Zoning Board Decisions, in 1987 ZONING & PLANNING LAW
HANDBOOK 83,93-94; Note, Ex ParteContacts in Local Land Use Decisions, 15 B.C. ENV'TL
AFF. L. REV. 181 (1988).
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not allowing other parties a chance to respond to presented views.
More significantly, they can reinforce public perceptions that zoning boards are subject to special influence. This is particularly
problematic because of the ad hoc, dealmaking practices that characterize current zoning.
Despite these concerns, it would seem that some ex parte
communication is a natural and even necessary part of zoning
decisionmaking. Rezonings, despite their quasi-judicial character,
are nevertheless decided by local elected officials who are naturally and appropriately in contact with their constituents.2 4 8 To
the extent that such decisions will often reflect policy concerns as
well as factual determinations, it is natural that contacts occur.
Not only should this not distort substantive decisions, but indeed
such contacts might reflect a "democratic accuracy" ideal important to substantive correctness.
Similar concerns, though to a lesser degree, arguably also exist
with respect to variance and special-use decisions made by
appointed lay boards. Although such decisions are made pursuant
to established criteria, there is little doubt that sensitivity to local
concerns plays a role in decisionmaking because of the potential
impact change has on neighboring land. Further, the primary
expertise that such boards have is arguably in their capacity as rephi rrespect they not
resentatives of community concerns. 249 In this
only reflect their own natural biases, but it is not inappropriate to
listen to community concerns.
For these reasons ex parte communications should not be prohibited but rather regulated through disclosure requirements. In
most instances such disclosure requirements should provide a sufficient basis for a response from interested parties.25 ° In this
respect, both technical discussions and more general constituent
concerns can be revealed at zoning hearings.
5.

Campaign Contributions

A final and particularly difficult issue in regulating bias in zoning is the receipt of campaign contributions by a decisionmaker
who must later decide an issue affecting the contributor. Although
248. See Westside Hilltop Survival Committee v. King County, 96 Wash. 2d 171, __,
634 P.2d 862, 866 (1981Xlegislators and their constituents advocate legislation which is an
integral part of representative government at every level).
249. See Rose, supra note 7, at 860.
250. See Barton Contracting Co. v. City of Afton, 268 N.W.2d 712, 715-16 (Minn.
1978Xtechnical information provided zoning officials in prior proposal made part of record
in present case so as to provide party with opportunity to respond).

210

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65:161

this might occur under various scenarios, it most frequently
involves political support from pro-development groups and individuals, such as developers, who subsequently seek zoning
changes.25 1 Participation by decisionmakers in such situations
raises serious fairness concerns, primarily because of the perception that favorable decisions can be bought.
Despite the substantial legitimacy concerns raised by participation under these circumstances, regulation is very difficult
because of the political and first amendment implications of candidate support. Political support in general, and campaign contributions in particular, are important avenues for political
participation designed to establish community preference. Further, campaign contributions are a form of political expression
within the contours of the first amendment. The Supreme Court
has recognized the first amendment implications of contributions
on several occasions, noting that they "serve as a general expression of support for candidates ' 25 2 and that they also are a form of
protected political association.2 5 3
The first amendment nature of campaign contributions, however, does not insulate them from reasonable regulation. This was
established in Buckley v. Valeo 2 4 where the Court upheld the
constitutionality of the Federal Election Campaign Act and its limitation of a $1,000 contribution by an individual contributor to a
particular candidate. 255 Although the Court recognized the first
amendment nature of contributions, 25 6 it stated that limiting the
amount of a contribution would entail "only a marginal restriction" on speech.2 5 7 Importantly, the Court noted that avoiding
the perception of undue influence was of sufficient importance to
justify placing a reasonable limitation on expenditures, stating:
"Congress could legitimately conclude that the avoidance of the
appearance of improper influence 'is also critical... if confidence
in the system of representative government is not to be eroded to

a disastrous extent.'

-258

This concern for confidence in our governmental system
251. See, e.g., Woodland Hills Residents Ass'n, Inc. v. City Council, 26 Cal. 3d 938, -,
609 P.2d 1029, 1032, 164 Cal. Rptr. 255, 258 (1980Xdeveloper and business associates gave
campaign contributions to 13 of 15 city council members).
252. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21 (1976).
253. Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 295-96 (1981); Buckley,
424 U.S. at 22.
254. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
255. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 22 (1976).
256. Id. at 21-22.
257. Id. at 20.
258. Id. at 26, 27.
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which forms the basis for regulation in Buckley is clearly applicable to the zoning context. The appearance of and potential for a
large contributor gaining undue influence over a local elected official is at least as great, if not greater, than it is in federal elections.2 59 Further, the unique nature of zoning decisions, where
the recipient of campaign funds might participate in the granting
of a substantial benefit specifically directed to a contributor, creates a far greater appearance of quid pro quo than normally occurs
in politics.
For these reasons some regulation of campaign contributions
to local officials is not only permissible but necessary. At a minimum this should include placing limits on contributions in local
elections. As interpreted by the Court in Buckley, such a form of
regulation imposes only a marginal restriction on first amendment
exercise 260 while at least partially offsetting the potential for and
appearance of improper influence. Indeed, most states now have
disclosure requirements and contribution limitations applicable to
local officials. 2 '
A more difficult question is whether the problems posed by
campaign contributions also justify the disqualification of decisionmakers from decisions involving contributors to their campaign. The limited number of decisions addressing this issue have
consistently held that the receipt of campaign contributions does
not create conflicts of interest justifying disqualification. Perhaps
the leading decision in this regard is Woodland Hills Residents
Association, Inc. v. City Council 26 2 in which a developer, who
needed subdivision approval from the city council, gave more than
$9,000 in campaign contributions through himself and various
business associates to a majority of the council members who voted
to approve the subdivision. 6 3 The California Supreme Court held
that the contributions did not create an impermissible conflict of
interest, 264 specifically emphasizing that "[r]epresentative govern259. The fewer number of contributors at the local level and the subsequently less
amount of money raised suggest that a contribution will have greater impact and thus
potentially more influence than a comparable contribution at the federal level.
260. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 20-21.
261. E.g., HAw. REV. STAT. §§ 11-212 to 11-213 (1985 & Supp. 1988Xrequiring
preliminary, supplemental and final reports of campaign contributions); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. ch. 42.17 (Supp. 1989), applied in Westside Hilltop Survival Committee v. King
County, 96 Wash. 2d 171, -, 634 P.2d 862, 866 (1981).
262. 26 Cal.3d 938, 609 P.2d 1029, 164 Cal. Rptr. 255 (1980).
263. Woodland Hills Residents Ass'n, Inc. v. City Council, 26 Cal.3d 938, -, 609 P.2d
1029, 1032, 164 Cal. Rptr. 255, 258 (1980).
264. Id. at -, 609 P.2d at 1032, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 258. Although it stressed first
amendment concerns, the court first noted that the receipt of campaign contributions were
not grounds for disqualification under California's Political Reform Act, which specifically
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ment would be thwarted by depriving certain classes of voters
(i.e., developers, builders, engineers, and attorneys who are
related in some fashion to developers) of the constitutional right to
26 5
participate in the electoral process.The concern expressed by the court in Woodland Hills
touches upon the primary problem with disqualification for contributions. Unlike limitations on contributions which only have a
marginal effect on expression as noted in Buckley, disqualification
of the decisionmaker potentially has a substantial effect. Presumably the impetus for most campaign contributions is the politically
compatible views of the contributor and recipient on land use
issues; thus, those decisionmakers who have received contributions
are those most likely to be sympathetic to the contributor without
regard to the contribution. But if recipients of contributions are
disqualified, there is a strong disincentive for citizens to financially
support local legislators for fear of losing the votes of those officials
most sympathetic to their position.
For similar reasons it is also often difficult to assume in such
situations that favorable decisions are the result of impermissible
influences on the decision itself rather than merely a reflection of
the official's political biases which induced the contribution in the
first place. Legitimacy concerns are therefore less threatened
when there is a perception that favorable votes are a legitimate
and predictable part of the democratic system. Further, to the
extent that much zoning is inherently political and responsive to
public preference, the use of campaign contributions is a legitimate means of establishing preferences. Again, disqualification in
such a situation potentially precludes those most likely to seek zoning requests from helping to establish the policies by which those
requests will be decided.
For these reasons disqualification for campaign contributions
is problematic and should be avoided. The problem of campaign
contributions influencing votes and undermining zoning legitimacy should instead be addressed through secondary means, such
as placing limits on contributions and implementing disclosure
requirements. Although such indirect forms of regulation will
only partially alleviate the concerns in this area, they represent
provided only for disclosure of such interests. Id. at -, 609 P.2d at 1032, 164 Cal. Rptr. at
259; Political Reform Act of 1974, CAL. GOV'T CODE § 84105 (1987Xrequiring disclosure of
contributions of $5,000 or more).
265. Id. at -, 609 P.2d at 1033, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 260.
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the best balance of the political, legitimacy, and accuracy issues
raised.
Such indirect regulations should take two forms. First, statutory limits can and should be placed on contributors in local elections. Although it is unclear from Buckley how far such limits can
go, 26 6 the significantly greater legitimacy concerns raised by contributions in local elections suggested that limitations substantially
below $1,000 should be permissible.
Second, campaign contributions should be made subject to
disclosure requirements. Almost all states now have campaign disclosure requirements which apply to local campaigns.2 67 Additionally, however, local officials should be required to disclose the
receipt of campaign contributions at the time of decisions involving contributions as an alternative to disqualification. 68 Requiring
disclosure in such a manner would be similar to disclosure of ex
parte contacts and would have an important restraining effect on
the affected decisionmakers and lend some appearance of propriety. It also allows some recourse through the electoral process
which, if at times overrated, provides another form of indirect
regulation.2 6 9
V.

REMEDIES AND ENFORCEMENT

This article has so far examined the need for regulating zoning
conflicts of interest, possible grounds for such regulation, and the
specific types of conflicts that might occur. In doing so it has occasionally alluded to judicial remedies for conflicts, which have been
primarily disqualification of decisionmakers. It is important, however, to more closely examine the consequences of an impermissible conflict of interest, both with regard to appropriate action by
the decisionmaker and also in terms of judicial review of decisions
involving bias and conflicts of interest.
266. Although the Court in Buckley upheld the validity of a $1,000 limit on
contributions in federal elections, it also seemed to suggest by its discussion of the first
amendment status of contributions that a complete ban or unreasonable limitation would
be impermissible. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 24.
267. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 2/3, 912(5Xb) (Smith-Hurd 1988Xrequiring
candidates for public utilities citizens board, to keep records of contributions of $25 or
more); N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 14-102 (McKinney 1978 & Supp. 1988Xrequiring treasurers of
campaign committees to file statements of receipts, contributions and expenditures).
268. But see Life of the Land, Inc. v. City Council, 61 Haw. 390, -, 606 P.2d 866, 90102 (1980X$400 campaign contribution was not a conflict of interest requiring disclosure
under conflict of interest laws).
269. See Westside Hilltop Survival Committee v. King County, 96 Wash. 2d 171, __
634 P.2d 862, 866 (1981Xpolitical process may sanction councilmen who had ex parte
contact with rezoning applicant).
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The initial issue for determination is what action is required of
a decisionmaker with a conflict of interest. State statutes regulating conflicts of interest take several approaches, although usually
dividing into two general groups. First are those statutes which
require disclosure of the conflict but not disqualification. An
example is New York's municipal code which, in identifying specific conflicts of interests, provides only that the decisionmaker
practice full disclosure.2 7 0 The rationale behind such disclosure
provisions would appear to be that public knowledge of the conflict will have a restraining effect on the decisionmaker sufficient
to ensure a fair result. Further, the openness of such disclosure
supports legitimacy by avoiding the specter of secret deals and
corruption.
The second and more common provision is to prohibit participation when a conflict of interest exists.27

1

The rationales behind

this are obvious. Although disclosure has some restraining effect, a
significant conflict might still affect the substantive outcome of a
decision. More importantly, perceptions of fairness and legitimacy
are only partly addressed by disclosure.
For these reasons disqualification rather than disclosure is the
preferable approach. Although in some instances disclosure might
adequately address the need for impartiality, in many instances it
will only be partially effective. The inconvenience of adjusting to
the disqualification of a decisionmaker is not so great as to justify
the threat to accuracy and legitimacy posed by the requirement of
mere disclosure.
Beyond determining what effect a conflict of interest should
have on a particular decisionmaker is what judicial remedies
should be available when a zoning decision in fact involved an
improper conflict of interest. In those instances in which the
biased decisionmaker casts a dispositive vote, courts have consistently invalidated the decision. 2 This seems appropriate in that
both accuracy and legitimacy concerns are clearly threatened
270. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 809 (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1989).
271. Most statutes do not expressly mention disqualification but instead prohibit
participation in decisionmaking when certain conflicts exist. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 11-4354 (1977X"no councilmen shall be entitled to vote on any question in which he, his
employer or employee has a special financial interest..."); ARz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-222
(1977X"A supervisor shall not vote upon any matter in which he, any member of his family
or his partner is pecuniarily interested"). Prohibiting participation means, of course, that
the decisionmaker must disqualify him or herself.
272. See, e.g., Olley Valley Estates, Inc. v. Fussell, 232 Ga.779, 208 S.E.2d 801 (1974);
Tuxedo Conservation & Taxpayers Ass'n v. Town Board, 96 Misc. 2d 1, 408 N.Y.S.2d 668
(1978).
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when a decision appears to turn on the vote of a self-interested

decisionmaker.
A more difficult issue is whether the participation of a conflicting member whose vote was not determinative to a decision
should also result in invalidation. This might occur in two general
situations. First is where the tainted vote was numerically unnecessary for the decision. Courts have evenly split on this issue, with
a slight majority favoring invalidation.2 7 3 Courts refusing to invalidate such decisions have primarily reasoned that even without the

tainted vote the decision would have occurred anyway and therefore invalidation is improper.2 7 4 In this sense the threat to accuracy and legitimacy concerns is arguably de minimus when the
particular vote is apparently not crucial to a decision. In particular, legitimacy concerns are less threatened when a decision
appears inevitable. As a result, the administrative burden of invalidating and remanding a decision outweighs any threat to substantive results and perceptions of fairness.
Despite these distinctions, several strong reasons exist for
invalidating decisions even when a tainted decisionmaker's vote
was numerically unnecessary for the decision. First, courts invalidating such decisions have noted that collegial decisionmaking
ideally involves the exchange of ideas and views, often with the
intent of persuading toward a particular position. 5 The actual
contribution of any particular decisionmaker cannot be measured
with precision, but frequently extends significantly beyond the
actual vote cast.2
For this reason, a significant threat to accuracy
273. Courts holding that such conflicts still require invalidation include: Daly v. Town
Plan & Zoning Comm'n, 150 Conn. 495, 191 A.2d 250 (1963); Wilson v. Iowa City, 165
N.W.2d 813 (Iowa 1969); Piggott v. Borough of Hopewell, 22 N.J. Super. 106, 91 A.2d 667
(1952); Baker v. Marley, 8 N.Y.2d 365, 170 N.E.2d 900, 208 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1960); Buell v.
City of Bremerton, 80 Wash. 2d 518, 495 P.2d 1358 (1972). Courts holding that a decision
should not be invalidated unless the tainted vote was decisive to the outcome include:
Murach v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 196 Conn. 192, 491 A.2d 1058 (1985); Waikiki
Resort Hotel v. City & County of Honolulu, 63 Haw. 222, 624 P.2d 1353 (1981); Anderson v.
City of Parsons, 209 Kan. 337, 496 P.2d 1333 (1972); Sims v. Bradley, 309 Ky. 626, 218
S.W.2d 641 (1949); Singewald v. Minneapolis Gas Co., 274 Minn. 556, 142 NW.2d 739
(1966); Totty v. Grantham Planning Bd., 120 N.H. 388, 415 A.2d 687 (1980). See also IOWA
CODE ANN. § 362.6 (West 198lXconflict of interest of participant does not invalidate vote
unless decisive to outcome).
274. See Anderson v. City of Parsons, 209 Kan. 337, __, 496 P.2d 1333, 1337
(1972Xwhere required majority existed without disqualified member's vote, result is not
invalidated).
275. See Daly, 150 Conn. at -, 191 A.2d at 252 (zoning decision invalidated by
participation of interested member of commission); Wilson, 165 N.W.2d at 819-20 (vote cast
in violation of conflict of interest statute, even if immaterial to outcome, vitiates the
proceeding).
276. Illustrative of this are the facts surrounding the Supreme Court's recent decision
in Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986). Although Lavoie involved a 5-4
decision and therefore a clearly decisive vote, several opinions of concurring U.S. Supreme
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can exist even when a particular vote was numerically unnecessary for the decision.
For similar reasons legitimacy concerns also exist even when a
vote is numerically unnecessary. Although legitimacy concerns
are less substantial in such circumstances, the perception of collegial decisionmaking and the potential influence of a tainted decisionmaker on others would violate "appearance of fairness"
standards. Thus, for both accuracy and legitimacy reasons the better view is that even when a vote is numerically unnecessary for a
decision courts should still invalidate it.
A second instance in which a tainted vote might not appear
dispositive to a decision and thus is arguably tolerable is when the
decisionmaker is on an advisory board which makes only a recommendation to the actual decisionmaking authority. This often
occurs with zoning and planning commissions which initially hold
hearings on zoning amendments and then make a recommendation to the local legislative body which in turn makes the determinative decision. If the tainted decisionmaker is only a member of
a recommending rather than the final decisionmaking body, the
improper bias is arguably not relevant to the final decision.
Despite this distinction, most courts addressing this issue still
invalidate the decision on the grounds that the recommendation is
closely tied to the final decision.2 7 7 This result is clearly appropriate in that such preliminary hearings and recommendations are
designed to play an important and integral role in the decisionmaking process. In many instances such preliminary decisions are
the sole source of a hearing, and thus those decisionmakers play a
crucial role in the interpretation and assessment of information.
Moreover, the perceived nexus between recommendation and
ultimate decision is such as to substantially threaten the legitimacy
of the final decision.
CONCLUSION
Bias and to some degree personal interests are an inevitable
part of any decisionmaking process, including zoning. Yet the ad
Court justices argued that the posture and history of the case indicated that the biased
judge below had initially written a dissenting opinion which persuaded at least one other
member of the lower court to change his position. Id. at 832 (Blackman, J., concurring).
277. See Buell v. City of Bremerton, 80 Wash. 2d 518, -, 495 P.2d 1358, 1362
(1972Xcouncil's zoning decision invalid where based on recommendation of commission
with an interested member). But see Thompson v. Cook County Zoning Board of Appeals,
96 I11.App. 3d 561, 572-73, 421 N.E.2d 285, 295 (1981Xcouncil's zoning decision not invalid
where interested member had prepared findings and signed the report).
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hoc, discretionary nature characterizing current zoning practices
makes the control of bias and conflicts of interest particularly
important. Not only are accurate zoning decisions necessarily contingent upon the control of improper influences, but the emphasis
on dealmaking raises legitimacy concerns exacerbated by baised
decisionmakers.
This article has examined various grounds for regulating
problems of bias and conflicts of interest in zoning. In doing so it
has suggested that regulation extend to rezoning decisions, even
absent statutory grounds, because of its essentially quasi-judicial
nature and because of the unique nature of local governments.
The actual scope of regulation, however, must balance several
concerns. Importantly, the basic concerns for accurate and legitimate decisions must be tempered by the pragmatic limits of regulation and sensitivity to the political dimensions of zoning.

